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CASE NOTES
Constitutional Law-Class Action Suit to Invalidate Divorce Residency
Requirement Not Moot, But Statute Is Upheld.-Plaintiff moved from
New York to Iowa in August of 1972. In September, 1972, she petitioned for
divorce. An Iowa court dismissed her suit for lack of jurisdiction because,
under state law, a petitioner in a divorce action must have been a state
resident for at least one year. I Plaintiff then sought declaratory and injunctive
relief in a federal district court on the grounds that Iowa's durational
residency requirement violated her rights to equal protection and due process.
After certifying the suit as a class action pursuant to rule 23(c)(1), 2 a
three-judge court upheld the Iowa statute. 3 Plaintiff appealed, but by the
time the litigation reached the Supreme Court she had satisfied the Iowa
statute and had obtained a divorce in another state. The Supreme Court held
that the case was not moot because it was a certified class action of a type
which would evade review "at the behest of any single challenger;" 4 that the
state interests in insulating divorce decrees from collateral attack and in not
becoming a "divorce mill" were sufficient to justify a classification based upon

recent interstate migration, and that the one-year residency requirement did
not deny Mrs. Sosna an individualized determination of residency, or access
to the courts, in a manner inconsistent with the due process clause. s Sosna v.
Iowa, 95 S. Ct. 553 (1975).
1.

The Mootness Issue

Article III, section two, of the Constitution limits the subject matter
jurisdiction of the federal judiciary to the resolution of "cases" and "controversies."' 6 The doctrine of mootness is one of several7 which the Supreme
Court has developed in order to determine whether a particular dispute
constitutes a "case" or "controversy" within the meaning of the Constitution. 8
1. Iowa Code Ann. § 598.6 (Cum. Pamphlet 1974).
2. Fed. R Civ. P. 23(c)(1). The class Mrs. Sosna represented included those Iowa residents
who desired to obtain divorces and were barred by the statute. Sosna v. Iowa, 95 S. Ct. 553, 556
(1975).

3. Sosna v. Iowa, 360 F. Supp. 1182 (N.D. Iowa 1973), aff'd, 95 S. CL 553 (1975).
4. 95 S. Ct. at 558.
5. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973) (irrebuttable presumption of non-residence for
students seeking in-state tuition rates held unconstitutional); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371
(1971) (divorce fee requirement effectively denying indigents access to courts held unconstitutional). An examination of the due process issues is beyond the scope of this Case Note. See
generally Bezanson, Some Thoughts on the Emerging Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine, 7 Ind.
L. Rev. 644 (1974).
6. U.S. Const. art III, § 2; e.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 36 (1974); DeFunis v.
Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 315-17 (1974); North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971) (per
curiam); see I J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1646 (5th ed.
1891).
7. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968). See also id. at 95 nn.10-13 (collection of
leading cases dealing with other case or controversy doctrines).
8. "A lawsuit which is, or has become, moot is neither a case nor a controversy in the
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Although no precise definition exists, a case is generally regarded as moot
when, due to events occurring subsequent to the filing of the complaint, a
judicial resolution of the issues it involves will no longer affect the legal rights
and relationships of the parties. 9 The doctrine requires that a live case or
controversy exist at all stages of the litigation, up to and including the time
the Supreme Court reviews the case.' 0
There are several ways in which a case may become moot." In a case such
as Sosna, in which the validity of a durational residency requirement is
constitutional sense and no federal court has the power to decide it." Diamond, Federal
Jurisdiction to Decide Moot Cases, 94 U. Pa. L. Rev. 125, 125-26 (1946). The case or controversy
limitation is one of several bases upon which the mootness doctrine may be justified. The others
are not of constitutional dimension and are less frequently mentioned in modern cases. See
Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 Yale L.J. 1363, 1383-84 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Monaghan]; notes 52-53 infra.
9. "Simply stated, a case is moot when the issues presented are no longer 'live' or the parties
lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome." Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496
(1969) (suit to compel House of Representatives to seat a member kept live after seating of
member by existence of claim for back pay); "Mootness is, therefore, the doctrine of standing set
in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the
litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness)." Monaghan 1384. See
Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 306 (1964) (injunction prohibiting construction workers from
picketing-owner's having posted indemnification bond saved case from mootness after building
had been completed); California v. San Pablo & T.R.R., 149 U.S. 308, 314 (1893) (where tile
state statute made payment of tax liability into bank the equivalent of payment to the state, offer
of such payment rendered suit by state for taxes moot); Note, Cases Moot of Appeal: A Limit on
the Judicial Power, 103 U. Pa. L. Rev. 772, 774 (1955).
10. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 319 (1974); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973)
(discussed in text accompanying notes 15-18 infra); cf. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459
n.10 (1974). When a case becomes moot the Supreme Court will ordinarily reverse or vacate tile
judgments of the lower courts and remand with a direction to dismiss. See United States v.
Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39 (1950). See generally Comment, Disposition of Moot Cases
by the United States Supreme Court, 23 U. Chi. L. Rev. 77 (1955).
11. See, e.g., United States v. New Jersey State Lottery Comm'n, 95 S. Ct. 941 (1975) (per
curiam) (change in statute); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974) (end of Vietnam war
rendered war protester's suit moot); Johnson v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 409 U.S. 75 (1972)
(per curiam) (suit by school children to obtain books held moot when books were obtained);
Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969) (suit concerning distribution of handbills opposing a
candiate for House of Representatives rendered moot when candidate became state judge);
Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952) (challenge to Bible reading in public schools
rendered moot by plaintiff's graduation from high school); Atherton Mills v. Johnson, 259 U.S.
13 (1922) (challenge by minor to tax imposed on employers of minors held moot when plaintiff
reached majority); Allen v. Sisters of St. Joseph, 490 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1974) (suit to compel
hospital to perform sterilization operation mooted when plaintiff obtained operation elsewhere).
Habeas corpus and similar proceedings were once thought to be rendered moot upon the
release of the prisoner. E.g., St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U.S. 41 (1943). Courts now permit
such suits to continue because of the continuing civil disabilities which attend a criminal
conviction. E.g., Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234
(1968). Where, however, such a challenge is not aimed at the conviction itself, but at the length of
the sentence imposed, completion of the sentence will moot the case. E.g., North Carolina v.
Rice, 404 U.S. 244 (1971).
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challenged by one who wishes to obtain a divorce, questions of mootness
could arise when the requirement is satisfied1 2 or when the divorce is
13
obtained.
The Supreme Court has established an exception within the doctrine of
mootness for cases which are "capable of repetition, yet evading review."' 4 In
the case of Roe v. Wade' s a pregnant woman sought to challenge the
constitutionality of a state abortion law. By the time her case reached the
Supreme Court her pregnancy had been terminated, and the case appeared to
be moot. The Court said that the case was capable of repetition because
"[p]regnancy often comes more than once to the same woman .... ,,t6
The
issue Roe sought to litigate would evade review because "the normal 266-day
human gestation period is so short that the pregnancy will come to term
before the usual appellate process is complete. ' 17 Thus, her controversy was
capable of repetition, yet evading review,' 8 and therefore not moot.
In class actions prior to Sosna questions regarding mootness focused upon
the class representative. A class action required, and still requires, a named
representative with a live case or controversy at the time the suit is filed.' 9 If
a class action were begun with more than one representative, subsequent
mootness as to some representatives would not render it moot so long as one
named representative continued to present a live controversy. 20 Left unre12. Sosna v. Iowa, 95 S. Ct. 553, 557 (1975). However, there do not appear to be any cases
holding such a case moot. See Shiffman v. Askew, 359 F. Supp. 1225, 1227-28 (M.D. Fla. 1973),
aff'd sub noma.Markes v. Askew, 500 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1974) (same equal protection challenge
as that involved in Sosna directed at a six month requirement-not moot because capable of
repetition, yet evading review).
13.

See Alton v. Alton, 347 U.S. 610 (1954).

14. Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911) (plaintiff ordered by ICC to
cease and desist giving rate preferences to third party for two years-suit to enjoin order reached
Supreme Court after the order expired) ("The questions involved in the orders of the Interstate
Commerce Commission are usually continuing . . .and their consideration ought not to be, as
they might be, defeated, by short term orders, capable of repetition, yet evading review .... .
This is not an exception to the doctrine of mootness in the sense that it permits the Court to
decide a moot case. It is rather a rule which, if applicable to the facts of a case which appears
moot, will lead to the conclusion that the case is, in fact, not moot. This rule is not to be confused
with a similar one under which a "[m]ere voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct" which
might "reasonably be expected to recur" will not moot a case because the mootness is sham in
nature. United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968).
15. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
16. Id. at 125.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974), citing Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31,
32-33 (1962) (per curiam) (equal protection challenge to breach-of-peace statutes by litigants who
failed to allege a threat of enforcement) and Indiana Employment Security Div. v. Burney, 409
U.S. 540 (1973) (per curiam); see Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 39 (1974).
20. Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512, 514 n.2 (1973) (challenge by prisoners to denial of right to
vote not mooted merely "because some of the named petitioners have lost their status as class
members .. . ."); Cypress v. Newport News Gen. & Nonsectarian Hosp. Ass'n, 375 F.2d 648,
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solved, however, was the question of whether a mootness inquiry was limited
to the class representatives or whether the class had a sufficiently independent
status to be the subject of a separate mootness inquiry and to survive the
subsequent mooting of every representative's suit.2 1 In addition, there remained the question of when, if at all, the class could take on this independent status, and who, if anyone, could continue to represent the class.
The Sosna Court acknowledged that "[i]f appellant had sued only on her
own behalf, both the fact that she now satisfies the one-year residency
requirement and the fact that she has obtained a divorce elsewhere would
make this case moot and require dismissal. '2 2 Mrs. Sosna's case could not be
considered live for it was not sufficiently likely that Mrs. Sosna would move
away from Iowa, later relocate there, and seek a divorce within one year of
her return.23 Despite the mootness of Mrs. Sosna's claim, however, it was
clear that the controversy between the defendant and the class she sought to
represent remained live. If the Court could focus on that controversy instead
of Mrs. Sosna's, the case would not be moot.
In holding that the class action could continue, the Court placed major
reliance upon Dunn v. Blumstein2 4 where a voter brought a class action suit
657 (4th Cir. 1967) (class action brought by doctor challenging discriminatory hiring practices not

mooted when he accepted a position on hospital staff).
21. Several prior cases indicated that the class could be treated independently. E.g.,
Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 36, 40 (1974) (inconclusive due to "unusual procedural
history" of case in state courts); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 317-19 (1974) (per curiam)
(dictum-case was not a class action); Johnson v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 409 U.S. 75, 79
n.7 (1972) (per curiam) (Marshall, J.,concurring); Brockington v. Rhodes, 396 U.S. 41, 43 (1969)
(per curiam) (suit to obtain ballot position mooted after election was held-Court suggested that if
the case had been a class action the result might have been different). Several lower courts had
considered the issue. In Thomas v. Clarke, 54 F.R.D. 245 (D. Minn. 1971) (mem.), the court was
able to state that, "[i]t is well settled that the mooting of the named representative's claim does
not render the whole suit moot." Id. at 252. An examination of the cases cited therein reveals
much dicta and little solid authority. An opposite position was taken in Watkins v. Chicago
Housing Authority, 406 F.2d 1234, 1236-37 (7th Cir. 1969), and was equally unsupported. See
also Bledsoe, Mootness and Standing in Class Actions, I Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 430 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Bledsoe]; Monaghan 1385; Note, The Mootness Doctrine in the Supreme
Court, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 373, 390-95 (1974) (analysis of Ramirez and DeFunis); Note, Mootness
on Appeal in the Supreme Court, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1672, 1689 (1970).
22. 95 S. Ct. at 557.
23. Id. The Court will seldom engage in such speculation merely to save a case from
mootness. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 319 (1974) ("DeFunis will never again be
required to run the gantlet of the Law School's admission process ....");
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414
U.S. 488, 497 (1974) (similar reasoning in a standing context); SEC v. Medical Comm. for
Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403, 406 (1972) ("we find that 'the allegedly wrongful behavior [refusal
to include shareholder proposal in proxy statement] could not reasonably be expected to recur.' ")
(quoting United States v. Phosphate Export Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968)); Hall v. Beals, 396
U.S. 45, 49-50 (1969) (per curiam). Compare Indiana Employment Security Div. v. Burney, 409
U.S. 540 (1973) (per curiam) with id. at 544 (Marshall, J.,dissenting) (class action by worker for
unemployment insurance settled by class representative-majority, in remanding for consideration of mootness, apparently rejected dissent's contention that case was capable of repetition
because worker might later by employed and subsequently unemployed).
24. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).

CASE NOTES

1975]

challenging a durational residency requirement that denied him the right to
vote in the 1970 election. The case reached the Supreme Court after the
25
election had been held. Though the issue of mootness had not been litigated,

the Dunn Court said that the case was "capable of repetition, yet evading
review," 26 and that, "Blumstein has standing to challenge [the laws in
question] as a member of the class of people affected by the presently written
27

statute. 1

The principal distinction between Dunn and Sosna is that the named
plaintiff's claim in Dunn was said to be "capable of repetition," whereas Mrs.
Sosna's was not. 28 This concept does not focus on the public generally; it
refers to the litigants specifically.

29

Implicit in Dunn is the conclusion that

Blumstein might leave the state and later return and wish to vote within one
to speculate to save the suit
year. The Dunn Court was apparently willing
30
from mootness; the Sosna Court would not.

Without addressing itself to this distinction, the Sosna Court shifted the
focus of its inquiry from the representative to the class. This made the
concept of capacity for repetition irrelevant for there continued to exist,
within the class, individuals whose controversies had not yet become moot.
Evasion of review, however, remained relevant. The Court said:
[A] case such as this, in which. . . the issue sought to be litigated escapes full appellate
review at the behest of any single challenger, does not inexorably become moot by the
intervening resolution of the controversy as to the named plaintiffs."
The Court then added the following caveat:
25. In his dissent in Sosna, Justice White gave three reasons why Dunn provided little
support for the Sosna holding: 1) the entire mootness question in Dunn was treated in a footnote;
2) the parties in Dunn had not argued the issue; 3) the Dunn Court had not explored the
"ramifications for the question of mootness in a class action setting." 95 S. CL at 565 (White, J.,
dissenting). Since questions of mootness involve the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court, they
can be raised sua sponte.
26. 405 U.S. at 333 n.2.
27. Id. This was an attempt to distinguish Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45 (1969). in which the
Court held that where a challenged durational residency requirement was shortened, those
plaintiffs who would not have been affected by the new statute lacked standing. Since none of the
named representatives would have been so affected, the case was held moot.
28. 95 S. Ct. at 557.
29. In DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (per curiam), the Court refused to extend
the application of the concept beyond DeFunis himself even though new law school applicants
were constantly being affected by the allegedly illegal admissions policy. The discussion of
mootness in the Dunn footnote, 405 U.S. at 333 n.2, is not sufficiently detailed to indicate
whether the Court focused solely upon Blumstein's individual claim. It seems clear, however,
that the Court must have done so, since later applications of the concept emphasize the eapacity
of repetition of the individual's claim, rather than those of others in his position. Compare Sosna
v. Iowa, 95 S. Ct. 553, 557 (1975), with DeFunis v. Odegaard, supra at 318-19 (1974).
30. 95 S. Ct. at 557; see note 23 supra and accompanying text. It requires considerably less
speculation to imagine that Blumstein would leave the state and later return and wish to vote
than it does to imagine that Mrs. Sosna would leave the state, remarry, and later return to seek a
divorce within one year.
31. 95 S. CL at 558.
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[Tihe same exigency that justifies this doctrine serves to identify its limits. In cases in
which the alleged harm would not dissipate during the normal time required for
resolution of the controversy . . . the plaintiff's personal
stake in the litigation [must]
32
continue throughout the entirety of the litigation.
Thus, evasion of review "at the behest of any single challenger" was viewed
as a concept capable of saving a class action from mootness where the class
and the defendant remain at odds, but there is no other basis upon which to
keep the suit live.
The reason Dunn appeared to support the result in Sosna is that Dunn can
be, and, in view of the speculation implicit in Dunn's holding, perhaps should
have been, analyzed in terms of the reasoning in Sosna. Dunn was a class
action involving an issue that would evade review at the behest of any single
challenger, and when Blumstein's suit appeared to have become moot there
still existed, between his class and the defendant, a live controversy. The
difference between the language in the two cases is due to Dunn's having been
decided on a narrower ground-since Blumstein's individual suit was adjudged to be capable of repetition, the Court did not have to shift its focus
from his claim to that of the class he sought to represent.
Once the Sosna Court had concluded that, for the purposes of a mootness
inquiry, the class could be treated independently of its representative, and
that a live controversy "may exist . . . between a named defendant and a
member of the class . . . even though the claim of the named plaintiff has

become moot," 3 3 it turned to the question of when it may be so treated.
Under rule 23(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure the district court
must determine whether a suit may be maintained as a class action. 34 This
determination, referred to as "certification, ' 35 confers upon members of the
class rights and burdens similar to those of actual litigants. 36 The Sosna
Court chose the time of certification as the time at which the class acquires a
status independent of its representative for the purpose of determining
mootness. 3 7 This seems a logical choice in view of the amorphous character of
some classes prior to that time, 38 but it raises a problem.
The "exigency" which "justifies" the Sosna rule is the rapidity with which
32.

Id. at 558-59.

33. Id. at 559.
34. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1).
35. 95 S. Ct. at 557.
36. Once a class action is certified the members of the class become bound by a judgment on
the merits, and the suit may not be settled or dismissed without court approval. Id. at 557 n.8;
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2), 23(c)(3), 23(e). The interests of the class must be "fairly and adequately"
protected by the class representative. Id. 23(a)(4). Members of the class may "enter an appearance
through . . . counsel" in some cases. Id. 23(c)(2)(C). Whether or not such an appearance is
entered, class members will be bound unless they request exclusion from the class under rule
23(c)(2)(A). Advisory Committee's Note on the Proposed Rule of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 98,
105 (1966) rhereinafter cited as Advisory Committee's Note].
37. 95 S. Ct. at 557.
38. See Board of School Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 95 S. Ct. 848 (1975) (per curiam); O'Shea v.
Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 n.3 (1974).
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certain types of cases become moot. 9 It is possible that in some cases
circumstances would be so "exigent" that the claims of the named plaintiffs
would become moot before the district court certified the suit as a class action.
Assuming, in such cases, that the litigation proceeds to the point of certification, the question would arise "whether the certification can be said to 'relate
"40
back' to the filing of the complaint ....
The Court's concept of relation back is presumably derived from rule 15(c)
which makes amendments to a pleading relate back to the time the pleading
was originally filed. 4 1 Unless certification can be said to relate back to the
filing of the complaint in a class action, the Sosna rule, which applies only to
certified class actions, would be inapplicable to those cases in which its use is
most justified. The Sosna Court suggested that the relation back device could,
on occasion, be used, and explained that whether it could be used would
"depend upon the circumstances of the particular case and especially the
reality of the claim that otherwise the issue would evade review.' 12
Although the Court did not mention it, relation back would be consistent
with an existing rule that a class action is "presumptively valid" until the
district court makes a negative determination. 4 3 In addition, it has been
suggested that certification should always precede a mootness inquiry because
prior
to that time the court does not know which claims are actually before
it. 44 If this suggestion were followed, the problem of relation back would be
avoided for no court would ever consider the constitutional issue of mootness

in a class action prior to its certification.
The essence of the holding in Sosna, that the members of the class may be
treated independently in determining mootness, raises the even more significant problem of the degree of precision courts must now achieve in their
rule 23 findings. This did not become apparent until after Sosna was decided.
In Board of School Commissioners v. Jacobs, 45 a high school student posed a
first amendment challenge to various rules and regulations relating to student
39. See 95 S. CL at 558 n.9.
40. 95 S. CL at 559 n.11.
41. Fed. R_ Civ. P. 15(c).
42. 95 S. Ct. at 559 n.11 (dictum).
43. For a discussion of the presumptive validity of class actions prior to certification see
Bledsoe 446-51. The doctrine finds some support in the Advisory Committee's Note which states
that "[a] negative determination means that the action should be stripped of its character as a
class action." Advisory Committee's Note 104. It has been said that these words mean that a
purported class action is not to be stripped of its character as such until a negative determination
is made. E.g., Washington v. Wyman, 54 F.R.D. 266, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). But see Board of
School Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 95 S. CL 848 (1975) (per curiam) (discussed at notes 45-54 infra and
accompanying text).
44. See Bledsoe 450. Bledsoe's suggestion, the doctrine of presumptive validity and the
relation back device each create a substantial conceptual difficulty regarding the source of the
district court's subject matter jurisdiction to certify a class action at the behest of one who no
longer has an interest in the action. The theories seem simple enough, but their application
involves the erection of fictions to circumvent a constitutional limitation. See 95 S. CL at 564
(WVhite, J., dissenting).
45. 95 S. Ct. 848 (1975) (per curiam).
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publications. The suit was certified as a class action in a casual manner, and,
although the plaintiff prevailed on the merits in both the district court and the
court of appeals, the judgment did not "include and describe those whom the
court [found] to be members of the class," '46 as required by rule 23(c)(3). The
school sought and obtained certiorari, but by the time the suit reached the
Supreme Court the student had graduated. The Court held that Sosna was
inapplicable because certification had been inadequate. 47 The Court
explained:
The need for definition of the class purported to be represented by the named plaintiffs
is especially important in cases like this one where the litigation is likely to become
moot as to the initial named plaintiffs prior to the exhaustion of appellate review. 48

The Court might have remanded for a more careful certification of what was
probably an entirely proper class action, and for a consideration of the issue
of relation back, or it might have held that the class was "presumptively
valid" since no negative determination had been made. Instead it vacated the
judgment of the court of appeals and remanded with instructions to dismiss as
49
moot.

The problem with the Jacobs holding is that the lower court in Sosna
arguably had been no more careful in making its rule 23 findings than had the
lower court in Jacobs.-0 The difference between the results might be
explained in terms of a procedural issue in Jacobs that was not present in
Sosna. The district court in Jacobs had denied a motion-" by the school board
to appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor plaintiffs pursuant to rule
17(c), 52 and the court of appeals affirmed. 53 If the Supreme Court had
reversed on the merits, members of the unnamed class of plaintiffs could have
attacked the final judgment alleging that their interests had not been
46. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3).
47. 95 S. Ct. at 850. Justice Douglas, dissenting, argued that the manner in which Jacobs had
been certified was almost indistinguishable from that in Sosna. Id. at 851 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
48. Id. at 850. Although the words of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1) do not appear to indicate that a
definition is contemplated, the Advisory Committee's Note reveals that the intent of the section is
"to give clear definition to the action." Advisory Committee's Note 104. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3)
clearly contemplates a definition of the class.
49. 95 S. Ct. at 850. See generally Comment, Disposition of Moot Cases by the United States
Supreme Court, 23 U. Chi. L. Rev. 77 (1955). Contrasting markedly with the strict requirements
of Jacobs is the Sosna Court's discussion of the adequacy of Mrs. Sosna's representation of the
class. The Court said: "[Wlhere it is unlikely that segments of the class ... would have interests
conflicting with [Mrs. Sosna's], and where the interests of that class have been competently urged
at each level of the proceeding .. . the test of Rule 23(a) is met." 95 S. Ct. at 559 (footnote
omitted). So lenient a requirement would be surprising had the parties not stipulated that Mrs.
Sosna was an adequate representative. Id. at 556. See generally 15 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev.
1326 (1975).
50. See 95 S. Ct. at 851 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
51. Jacobs v. Board of School Comm'rs, 349 F. Supp. 605, 607 (S.D. Ind. 1972), aff'd, 490
F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1973), vacated as moot, 95 S. Ct. 848 (1975).
52. Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c).
53. Jacobs v. Board of School Comm'rs, 490 F.2d at 603-04.
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adequately protected.5 4 Since the action was moot as to the named plaintiffs,
and the Court could not make a determination which would be binding on the
rest of the class, vacation appeared appropriate.
If the Court is to view the class independently of its representative, it must
tighten the requirements of rule 23 to prevent the policies behind the rule and
the doctrine of mootness from being undermined. s5 For example, in determining whether a representative will "fairly and adequately protect the interests
of [his] class"'5 6 it would be relevant to consider whether the representative
has or had a "personal stake"57 in the outcome and whether there exists a
"concrete adverseness"58 between the class representative and the defendant.5 9 Similarly, strict adherence to the certification requirement and the
requirement that the court's judgment describe the members of the class can
help insure that the class itself actually presents a live controversy.
It has been suggested that in cases such as Sosna the litigation could be
suspended for a "reasonable period of time" in order that a new class
representative, one whose controversy remains live, can be found to replace
the original representative. 60 This procedure has been followed in lower court
cases with some success, 6 1 and it would doubtless restore adverseness to those
cases in which the representative's personal stake has become diminished.
The obvious problem with this alternative in cases such as Sosna would be
the finding of substitute representatives from within a class of unknown bona
fide new state residents. In most cases, however, this alternative would be
feasible, and in any case the difficulty might be justified if it provided a
higher degree of "concrete adverseness . . . upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination .
"..
62
54. See id.; Roberts v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 256 F.2d 35, 39 (5th Cir. 1958) (judgment against
minors reversed on ground of failure to appoint).

55. Dissenting in Jacobs, Justice Douglas complained that the Court appeared to be embarking "upon a program of scrupulous enforcement of compliance" with the requirements of rule 23.
95 S. CL at 851 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
56. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
57. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). "Personal stake" is ordinarily associated with
the doctrine of standing, but it is also one of the policies underlying the doctrine of mootness. See
Monaghan 1383-86; Note, Mootness on Appeal in the Supreme Court, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1672,
1677 (1970). Notice, in this regard, that Justice White's dissent in Sosna is largely a discussion of
what he viewed to be Als. Sosna's lack of standing.
58. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). Like "personal stake," the policy of "adverseness" underlies the doctrine of mootness as well as that of standing. See Note, Cases Moot on
Appeal: A Limit on the Judicial Power, 103 U. Pa. L. Rev. 772, 773 (1955).
59. It might be argued that a representative whose controversy has become moot is not
typical of a class whose controversy has not. See Bledsoe 460-61; cf. Watkins v. Chicago
Housing Authority, 406 F.2d 1234, 1236 (7th Cir. 1969) ("It must be a novel theory, at least one
to which we do not subscribe, that named plaintiffs without the right to further represent
themselves can continue to represent unnamed parties allegedly in a similar situation.").
60. Bledsoe 461.
61. E.g., Washington v. Wyman, 54 F.R.D. 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Gaddis v. Wyman, 304 F.
Supp. 713 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). See also Bledsoe 461 nn.149-50 and accompanying text. This is
essentially the procedure followed at the state level in Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 38
(1974).

62.

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
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The Sosna holding is valuable for the distinctions it draws between the
Court's inquiry under article I and that under rule 23. Confusion naturally
arises because both are meant to assure full presentation, to the Court, of
opposing sides of an issue. Sosna holds that at certification a class becomes, in
effect, a party to the litigation 63 and should be the focus of a mootness
inquiry. This is consistent with the purpose of article Ill-to ensure the
existence of an actual controversy between the parties to a suit. Rule 23, on
the other hand, ensures that the interests of the class are adequately represented.
2. The Equal Protection Issue
Any classification based on length of residence in a state places a burden on
the right of interstate travel. In examining state residency requirements, the
Court has employed a two-step analysis, inquiring into both the nature of the
classification and the state's justification for its use: does the classification
have enough of an impact to "penalize '64 interstate travel, 65 and, if so, is it
necessary to promote a compelling state interest. If no penalty is imposed, the
66
state need only show a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest.
Whether a state has imposed a penalty depends upon the importance of the
benefit or right withheld. If the benefit is deemed to be a basic "necessity of
life" 67 such as welfare (Shapiro v. Thompson 68) or medical aid (Menorial
Hospital v. MaricopaCounty6 9 ), or if the right is a "fundamental" one such as
the right to vote (Dunn v. Blumstein70 ), the right to travel is penalized.
"Necessities of life" and fundamental rights include neither higher education 7 '
63. 95 S. Ct. at 557.
64. The term was first used in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969), and has been
carried forward in subsequent cases. E.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250,
257 (1974). For a criticism of this term, and a good pre-Sosna analysis of the divorce residency
requirement see Comment, Durational Residency Requirements for Divorce, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev.
187 (1974).
65. The right to travel interstate is a "basic" right. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338
(1972) (and cases cited therein). Its historical development is traced in Z. Chafee, Three Human
Rights in the Constitution 162-213 (1956); Note, Shapiro v. Thompson: Travel, Welfare and the
Constitution, 44 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 989, 989-993 (1969); Note, The Right to Travel-Quest For a
Constitutional Source, 6 Rutgers Camden L.J. 122, 123-26 (1974).
66. See generally San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36-40 (1973);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-28 (1961). The test was applied to durational
residency requirements in Sturgis v. Washington, 368 F. Supp. 38, 41 (W.D. Wash.), aff'd
mem., 414 U.S. 1057 (1973); Suffling v. Bondurant, 339 F. Supp. 257, 260 (D.N.M.), aff'd mem.
sub nom. Rose v. Bondurant, 409 U.S. 1020 (1972); Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234,
239-41 (D. Minn. 1970), aff'd mem., 401 U.S. 985 (1971).
67. This phrase also originated in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969), and
reappears in later cases. E.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 259 (1974).
68. 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969).
69. 415 U.S. 250, 259 (1974).
70. 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972).
71. Sturgis v. Washington, 368 F. Supp. 38, 41 (W.D. Wash.), aff'd mem., 414 U.S. 1057
(1973); Stains v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234, 238 (D. Minn. 1970), aff'd mem., 401 U.S. 985
(1971).
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nor admission to the practice of law, 72 and their denial imposes no penalty. If
requirea penalty has been imposed, the state must show that the residency
73
ment is necessary to promote a compelling state interest.
The Court has held that mere budgetary 74 or administrative 7 - concerns are
76
not compelling state interests while the prevention of fraud on the state is.
Even if the state can show a compelling interest, it must still demonstrate that
its residency requirement is necessary to promote that interest. If there exist
"other mechanisms . . . which would have a less drastic impact on constitu-

tionally protected interests, '77 then the state will be required to use them,
either in lieu of or in conjunction with a durational residency requirement. 78
Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Sosna did not apply the above analysis.
Instead the Court relied upon factual distinctions between the justifications
offered in Sosna and those offered in Shapiro, Dunn and Maricopa County.
Several factors, of varying degrees of importance, led to the conclusion
that "Iowa's residency requirement may reasonably be justified on [other]
grounds . . . .79 Of major importance was the consideration that domestic
relations laws are "regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States."'80
This factor was bolstered by "more than a century" of precedent disclaiming
federal authority over the subject of divorce.8 1 Another factor of some
significance was the existence of durational residency requirements for divorce
in 48 states, 8 2 the most common period imposed being one year.8 3 To uphold
the Sosna claim, then, the Court would have been required to overturn the
statutes of a majority of the states in an area historically reserved for the4
states themselves. Such an historical fact is not "to be lightly cast aside,"8
for, as the Court has said in a related contest, "[i]f a thing has been practised
72. See Suffling v. Bondurant, 339 F. Supp. 257, 258-59 (D.N.M.), aff'd mem. sub nom.
Rose v. Bondurant, 409 U.S. 1020 (1972).
73. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 262 (1974).
74. Id. at 263 (1974); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969).
75. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 267 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330, 349-51 (1972).
76. See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250. 268 (1974) (interest in
preventing fraud called "valid" in a context indicating that if the means chosen by the state had
not been overbroad, the compelling state interest test would have been met); Dunn v.Blumstein,
405 U.S. 330, 345 (1972).
77. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 268 (1974). Compare Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 353 (1972).
78. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 267-68 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein,
405 U.S. 330, 347-54, 357-60 (1972).
79. 95 S. Ct. at 561.
80. Id. at 559.
81. Id. at 559-60, citing Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 167 (1899); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95
U.S. 714, 734-35 (1877); Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 584 (1859).
82. 95 S. CL at 560.
83. Id. See, e.g., N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 230 (McKinney Supp. 1974) (in some cases the
requirement is increased to two years).
84. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970) (first amendment challenge to religious
property tax exemption).
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for two hundred years by common consent, it will need a strong case for the
Fourteenth Amendment to affect it ....",85 Having laid this foundation for
its opinion the Court began to examine Iowa's justification for its residency
requirement.
The principal justification offered by the Court for the requirement was
that it insulates the state's divorce decrees from collateral attack in other
states.8 6 Jurisdiction to grant a divorce is founded upon domicile,8 7 and "a
finding of domicile in ex parte proceedings . . .is not binding upon another

State" under the full faith and credit clause "in the face of 'cogent evidence' to
the contrary." 8 8 A durational residency requirement "provides a greater
safeguard against successful collateral attack than would a requirement of
bona fide residence alone"8 9 because it makes a finding of lack of domicile,
and thus lack of jurisdiction, by another state less likely. 90 The Court held
that the state's interest in creating this safeguard "requires a different
resolution of the constitutional issue presented than was the case in Shapiro
. . . Dunn . . . and Maricopa County . .

".."91

The Court also examined two other justifications for the residency requirement. Since divorce jurisdiction is founded upon domicile, the granting of a
divorce by a state in which a spouse has been present only a short time would
amount to "officious intermeddling in matters in which another State has a
paramount interest."'92 The Court explained:
A State such as Iowa may quite reasonably decide that it does not wish to become a
divorce mill for unhappy spouses who have lived there as short a time as appellant had
when she 93commenced her action in the state court after having long resided
elsewhere.

The final justification for the Iowa requirement involved the consequences
85. Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922) (statute requiring proof of negligence
in trespass actions relating to party walls upheld).
86. 95 S. Ct. at 562.
87. Id. at 561, citing Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945); Andrews v.
Andrews, 188 U.S. 14 (1903); Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175 (1901). It has been said that "[tlhe sterile
conceptualism of the dogma of domicile is obsolete. It has no place in a modern domestic relations
law." Foster, Recognition of Migratory Divorces: Rosenstiel v. Section 250, 43 N.Y.U.L. Rev.
429, 450 (1968).
88. 95 S. Ct. at 561-62, citing Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 236 (1945). Where a
party has been personally served or makes a personal appearance he or she is barred from making
this collateral attack on jurisdiction. Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581, 587 (1951); Sherrer v.
Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 352 (1948). As Justice Marshall points out in his dissent, Iowa's residency
requirement applies to all divorces, not merely ex parte divorces. 95 S. Ct. at 570. Mr. Sosna had
been personally served while in Iowa visiting his children, and he made a special appearance to
challenge jurisdiction. Id. at 555. Thus, Mrs. Sosna's divorce decree, had she obtained one,
would not have been susceptible to collateral attack.
89. 95 S. CL at 562.
90. Id. at 561-62 & n.21. But see id. at 571 (Marshall, J.,dissenting).
91. Id. at 562.
92. Id. at 561.
93. Id.
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of granting a divorce. A divorce can affect not merely the marital relationship, but also property rights and the custody and the support of children. 94
"With consequences of such moment riding on a divorce decree issued by its
courts, Iowa may insist that one seeking to initiate such a proceeding have the
modicum of attachment to the State required here." 95
The dissent of Justice Marshall, the author of Dunn and Maricopa County,
in which Justice Brennan, the author of Shapiro, joined, bears witness to the
departure which Sosna represents. As Justice Marshall correctly notes, the
Court's failure to employ the analysis developed in prior cases
suggests a new distaste for the mode of analysis [the Court has] applied to this corner
of equal protection law. In its stead, the Court has employed what appears to be an ad
hoc balancing test, under which the State's . . . interest in ensuring that its divorce

plaintiffs establish
some roots in Iowa is said to justify the one-year residency
96
requirement.
The Court might easily have applied the analysis found in prior cases
without altering Sosna's result. 97 It might have held that obtaining a divorce
within one's first year of residence is not a basic necessity of life or a
fundamental right and that its denial does not "penalize" the right to travel.
94. Id.
95. Id. Justice Marshall argued that the importance of these matters compelled an opposite
result because declining to exercise jurisdiction "freezes them in an unsatisfactory state," and thus
constitutes a hardship which long-time residents would not be required to bear. Id. at 569 n.3
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 567 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The two-tier analysis (rational relation to
legitimate state interest: necessary for compelling state interest) of prior cases has been criticized
for its rigidity. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. I,
17-18 (1972); The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 41, 117 (1974); see Comment,
Equal Protection in Transition: An Analysis and a Proposal, 41 Fordham L. Rev. 605, 611-14
(1973).
97. State Courts have done so. E.g., Whitehead v. Whitehead, 53 Hawaii 302, 492 P.2d 939
(1972); Davis v. Davis, 297 Minn. 187, 210 N.W.2d 221 (1973); Porter v. Porter, 112 N.H. 403,
296 A.2d 900 (1972); Sternshuss v. Sternshuss, 71 Misc. 2d 552, 336 N.Y.S.2d 586 (Sup. Ct.
1972); Coleman v. Coleman, 32 Ohio St. 2d 155, 291 N.E.2d 530 (1972); Stottlemyer v.
Stottlemyer, 224 Pa. Super. 123, 302 A.2d 830 (1973); Place v. Place, 129 V. 326, 278 A.2d 710
(1971) (6 month statute). But see State v. Adams, 522 P.2d 1125 (Alas. 1974). noted in 5
Cumberland-Samford L. Rev. 331 (1974).
The majority of federal courts that have dealt with the issue struck down the statutes. E.g.,
McCay v. South Dakota, 366 F. Supp. 1244 (D.S.D. 1973), vacated after Sosna, 95 S. CL 819
(1975) (mem.); Larsen v. Gallogly, 361 F. Supp. 305 (D.RLL 1973), vacated after Sosna. 95 S. Ct.
819 (1975) (mem.); Mon Chi Heung Au v. Lum, 360 F. Supp. 219 (D. Hawaii 1973) (striking
down the 1 year statute upheld in Whitehead, supra), rev'd after Sosna, No. 73-2654 (9th Cir.,
Feb. 5, 1975); Wymelenberg v. Syman, 328 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Wis. 1971), supplemented, 54
F.R1D. 198 (1972) (per curiam). But see Shiffman v. Askew, 359 F. Supp. 1225 (M.D. Fla. 1973)
(6 month statute), aff'd sub nom. Makres v. Askew, 500 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1974). It has been said
that ad hoc balancing would not be likely to change substantive results. The Supreme Court,
1973 Term, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 41, 118 (1974). See also Note, State Durational Residence
Requirements For Divorce: How Long is Too Long?, 31 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 359 (1974) (written
just prior to Sosna).
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Such a holding would have been reasonable, for obtaining a divorce within a
year of one's arrival in a state is not a benefit for which there is as significant
or as immediate a need as there might be for welfare or medical aid. Nor does
the right to obtain a divorce occupy as important a place in the hierarchy of
constitutionally protected rights as does the right to vote. 9 8 The absence of a
penalty would, under prior cases, have made an application of the traditional
"rational basis" standard of equal protection review appropriate.
The Sosna Court's ad hoc equal protection balancing test has the disadvantage of leaving behind nothing more than a series of "different resolution[s]." 99 In Sosna, for example, the closest the Court came to applying a
usable standard
was when it twice used, in a casual manner, the word
"reasonably."' 100 For this reason, Justice Marshall's "spectrum"''
approach,
under which "the degree of care with which the Court will scrutinize .. .
classifications [depends] on the . . . importance of the interest . . . affected
and the . . . basis upon which the . . . classification is drawn," °2 seems

preferable. It promises to achieve flexibility without ignoring the need for
definite standards and a principled analysis.
Thomas I. Sheridan III

Constitutional Law-Procedural Due Process-Reports of Fuentes' Demise "Greatly Exaggerated"--Georgia Garnishment Statute Held UnconstitutionaL--On August 20, 1971, respondent Di-Chem, Inc., brought
suit in state court against petitioner North Georgia Finishing, Inc., alleging
an indebtedness on goods sold and delivered. Seeking a statutory provisional
2
remedy, Di-Chem also filed an affidavit' and bond for a writ of garnishment,
98. Compare Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 383 (1971), with Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330, 336-37 (1972).
99. 95 S. CL at 562.
100. Id. at 561.
101. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98, 99 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
102. Id. at 99. Compare Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 253 (1974),
with Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972), and Sosna v. Iowa, 95 S. Ct. 553, 567 (1975)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
1. "The affidavit asserted the debt and 'reason to apprehend the loss of said sum or part
thereof unless process of Garnishment issues.' " North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 95
S. Ct. 719, 721 (1975), quoting Di-Chem's affidavit. The amount claimed was $51,279.17. Id.
n.2.
2. Although Ga.Code Ann. § 46-101 (1974) speaks in terms of "garnishment," the procedure
appears to operate also in the manner of an attachment. See Ga. Code Ann. § 46-102 (1974).
Compare Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 338 (1969). Under the Georgia statute,
"plaintiff or his attorney must make an affidavit before 'some officer authorized to issue an
attachment, or the clerk of any court of record in which the said garnishment is being filed or In
which the main case is filed, stating the amount claimed to be due in such action . . . .' § 46-102.
To protect defendant against loss or damage in the event plaintiff fails to recover, that section
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naming the petitioner's bank as garnishee. A court clerk issued a summons of
garnishment to the bank, which was served the same day. Three days later
the petitioner filed bond in superior court "conditioned to pay any final
judgment in the main action up to the amount claimed," '3 and the court
discharged the bank as garnishee. Subsequently, the trial court overruled
petitioner's motion to dismiss the writ of garnishment and discharge its bond,
rejecting the argument that Georgia's statutory procedure violated the debtor
corporation's right to due process. 4 The Georgia Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the statute. 5 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the garnishment procedure violated petitioner's right to
procedural due process. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 95
S. Ct. 719 (1975).
Di-Chem presents the most recent Supreme Court opinion in the continuing
judicial dialogue concerning the proper scope of procedural due process in the
area of prejudgment remedies. 6 "Prior to [1969], decisions of the Court
consistently sustained the constitutionality of prejudgment seizure of property
subject to litigation, reasoning7 that ultimate adjudication on the merits would
assure a defendant's rights."
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.8 was the first Supreme Court decision
which refused to follow this rule. In that case, a court clerk issued a writ of
garnishment upon the ex parte request of a creditor who was about to bring
suit on a note. The writ operated to freeze one-half of the debtor's wages, the
funds to be released only if the debtor prevailed on the merits of the suit.
Emphasizing the absence of both notice and hearing, the Supreme Court held
also requires plaintiff to file a bond in a sum double the amount sworn to be due." 95 S. Ct. at
721.

3. 95 S. Ct. at 721; see Ga. Code Ann. § 46-401 (1974). This procedure for a debtor's bond in
response to the attachment will be referred to as a "counterbond."
4. North Georgia Finishing also invoked the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 95 S. Ct. at 721.
5. North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 231 Ga. 260, 201 S.E. 2d 321 (1973). rev'd,
95 S. Ct. 719 (1975). The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 417 U.S. 907 (1974), fifteen days
after its decision in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974). After the decision of the
Georgia Supreme Court, a three judge federal court declared the same statutes unconstitutional
on the authority of Fuentes v. Sheven, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). Morrow Elec. Co. v. Cruse, 370 F.
Supp. 639, 642 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
6. This Case Note deals with the constitutionality of prejudgment attachments of property as
creditors' remedies, as distinguished from attachments for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction in
a state court, referred to as foreign attachments. Foreign attachments present different state
interests; see Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91 n.23 (1972). The constitutionality of foreign
attachments was upheld in Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921). See generally Comment,
Foreign Attachment After Sniadach and Fuentes, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 342 (1973).
7. Sugar v. Curtis Circulation Co., 383 F. Supp. 643, 645 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), prob. juris.
noted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3550 (U.S. Apr. 15, 1975) (No. 74-859), discussed in text accompanying note
45 infra.
8. 395 U.S. 337 (1969). For a discussion of pre-Sniadach decisions, see Note, Procedural Due
Process-The Prior Hearing Rule and the Demise of Fx Parte Remedies, 53 B.U.L. Rev. 41,
42-46 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Prior Hearing Rule].
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the state statute unconstitutional. 9 Although S'niadach paid deference to past
decisions' 0 by observing that garnishment might "well meet the requirements
of due process in extraordinary situations,"" the decision firmly established
the right of a wage-earner not to be deprived of his wages without adequate
preliminary procedures to safeguard his interests.' 2 However, it was unclear
whether the decision was limited to wages and other necessities. 13
A year later, in Goldberg v. Kelly, 14 the Court set forth a balancing test to
determine what interests should be afforded due process protection, and the
nature of the procedural due process required. 15 Subsequent decisions utilizing this test 16 suggest that the interests protected under the procedural due
process requirements of the fourteenth amendment need not be of such
9. 395 U.S. at 337-39 (facts), 342 (holding). See Note, Provisional Remedies in Now York
Reappraised Under Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.: A Constitutional Fly in the Creditor's
Ointment, 34 Albany L. Rev. 426 (1970); 4 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 585 (1970); 72 W. Va. L. Rev. 165
(1970).
10. See, e.g., Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950) (administrative
decision to make multiple seizures of misbranded and harmful drugs without a prior hearing does
not violate procedural due process); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947) (conservator's taking
possession of a savings and loan association without prior hearing upheld in light of the history
and custom of banking); Coffin Bros. & Co. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928) (execution by
superintendent of banks against stockholders of an insolvent bank upheld where stockholders had
failed to pay assessments); Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921) (condition that a defendant
post bond equal to the value of the property seized in a foreign attachment before he is allowed to
appear in defense of the action held constitutional). It has been suggested that Ownbey v.
Morgan should not be considered controlling. Comment, Foreign Attachment After Sniadach and
Fuentes, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 342, 346 (1973).
11. 395 U.S. at 339. "But in the present case no situation requiring special protection to a
state or creditor interest is presented ....
Id.
12. "[A] prejudgment garnishment of the Wisconsin type may as a practical matter drive a
wage-earning family to the wall." Id. at 341-42.
13. Note, Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.-The Repossession of Fuentes, 5 Memphis St. U.L.
Rev. 74, 77 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Note, Repossession of Fuentes].
14. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Goldberg held unconstitutional a New York procedure permitting
the termination of welfare benefits without prior notice or hearing. Id. at 266; see Comment, Due
Process and the Right to a Prior Hearing in Welfare Cases, 37 Fordham L. Rev. 604 (1969).
15. Quoting Cafeteria Workers, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961), the Court in
Goldberg stated that " 'consideration of what procedures due process may require under any
given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise . .. interest that has
been affected by governmental action.' " 397 U.S. at 263. See text accompanying notes 43, 44 &
59 infra.
16. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (unwed father's interest in caring for his child
held superior to the state's interest in prohibiting the domestic relationship); Lindsey v. Normet,
405 U.S. 56 (1972) (tenant's interest in housing insufficient to outweigh state's interest in summary
eviction procedure); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (suspension of driver's license without
opportunity for hearing held unconstitutional); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (state
procedure which denied indigents judicial dissolution of their marriage due to their inability to
pay court fees held unconstitutional).
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significance that their deprivation
would "as a practical matter drive a wage17
earning family to the wall.'
In Fuentes v. Shevin,' 8 the Court broadened part of the Goldberg test by
expanding the types of interests and deprivations which are significant enough
to require the protection of procedural due process. In Fuentes, the sevenJustice Court 9 scrutinized the prejudgment remedies of Florida and Pennsylvania; each state statute authorized ex parte writs of replevin upon a
creditor's conclusory allegation of ownership. Although the creditors were
required to post bond as security for the consumer goods attached, the
statutes made no provision for prior notice and hearing.20 The Court, through
Justice Stewart, ruled that the procedural due process requirement of a prior
hearing clearly was not "limited to the protection of only a few types of
property interests."''1 The four-Justice majority stated that "it is now well
settled that a temporary, nonfinal deprivation of property is nonetheless a
'deprivation' in the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment."22 Such deprivation, absent prior notice and hearing, would be permitted only in "special
situations demanding prompt action. "2- 3 Although the decision expanded the
post-Sniadach boundaries in which deprivations of property interests operated to trigger protective measures of procedural due process, Fuentes did not
propose any particular form which these protective measures might take
beyond prior notice and hearing. Fuentes' heavy emphasis on debtor protection 24 thus lessened the Court's flexibility in this area. 2 5 A creditor was hard
17. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 341-42 (1969).
18. 407 U.S. 67 (1972); see The Supreme Court, 1971 Term. 86 Harv. L. Rev. 52, 85-95
(1972); Note, The Prior Hearing Rule 49-59; 41 Fordham L. Rev. 1051 (1973).
19. Justices Powell and Rehnquist, both newly sworn in, did not participate. 407 U.S. 67, 97
(1972); see text accompanying note 66 infra.
20. 407 U.S. at 74-78.
21. Id. at 89. Citing Sniadach and Goldberg, the Court stated: "Both decisions were in the
mainstream of past cases, having little or nothing to do with the absolute 'necessities' of life ...
Id. at 88.
22. Id. at 84-85. "The Fourteenth Amendment draws no bright lines around three-day, 10day, or 50-day deprivations of property. Any significant taking of property by the State is within
the purview of the Due Process Clause." Id. at 86.
23. Id. at 93. Thus, the Court would permit ex parte seizure upon a showing of immediate
danger that the debtor will destroy or conceal goods, provided the statute is narrowly drawn to
meet only this situation. Id.
24. "Most simply stated, the rule developed by Fuentes is that except in the most extraordinary of situations, any state authorized deprivation of any significant property interest must be
preceded by notice and the opportunity for a hearing." Note, The Prior Hearing Rule 51 (emphasis
omitted).
25. Many observers regarded the decision as "one which, due to the substantive evil of ex
parte seizure orders running against the relatively poor members of society, was weighted so
strongly in favor of the debtor as almost inevitably to tip the balance in favor of some form of
prior adversary hearing." The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 41, 77 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as 1973 Term]. The inflexibility of Fuentes was illustrated by subsequent
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pressed, in light of Fuentes,
to show that his or the state's interest justified
26
any prejudgment seizure.
Late last term, in an attempt to return to a flexible approach-in this
context one which could afford varying types of procedural safeguards so as
to satisfy the different factual and legal conditions presented by future
cases-the Supreme Court decided Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co. 27 Justice
White, speaking for the four-Justice plurality, upheld a Louisiana statute that
allowed lienholders to obtain writs of sequestration 28 to forestall waste or
alienation of encumbered property without affording debtors any prior notice
or hearing.2 9 Thus, at least on its face, Mitchell appeared to be a radical
departure from the basic principle of Fuentes.30 However, the Court in
Mitchell set forth five separate aspects of the Louisiana procedure which
distinguished the statute
from those at issue in Fuentes and refused to
31
overrule prior law.

Initially, the writ of sequestration examined in Mitchell could not issue on
the creditor's "conclusory allegations" of ownership. Instead, the creditor was
required to file an affidavit alleging "specific facts" regarding the nature and
amount of the claim, as well as the grounds relied upon for the issuance of the
writ. 32 Mitchell noted that the Florida statute struck down in Fuentes had
required only a conclusory allegation that the creditor had a right to possession. 33 The second distinguishing factor was that the Louisiana writ could
decisions which uniformly required notice and hearing. See, e.g., Turner v. Colonial Fin. Corp.,
467 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1972); Dorsey v. Community Stores Corp., 346 F. Supp. 103 (E.D. Wis.
1972); Sena v. Montoya, 346 F. Supp. 5 (D.N.M. 1972). "[lIt was unnecessary for the Fuentes
opinion to have adopted so broad and inflexible a rule ....
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416
U.S. 600, 624 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
26. See 41 Fordham L. Rev. 1051, 1060-61 (1973).
27. 416 U.S. 600 (1974). "Mitchell ... marks a substantial retreat by the Supreme Court
from prior precedent relating to the procedural due process requirement of prior notice and
hearing generally and to the constitutional validity of creditors' prejudgment seizure remedies
particularly." Hobbs, Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.: The 1974 Revised Edition of Consumer Due
Process, 8 Clearinghouse Rev. 182 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Hobbs].
28. "Sequestration under the Louisiana statutes is the modern counterpart of an ancient civil
law device to resolve conflicting claims to property. Historically, the two principle concerns have
been that, pending resolution of the dispute, the property would deteriorate or be wasted in the
hands of the possessor and that the latter might sell or otherwise dispose of the goods. A minor
theme was that official intervention would forestall violent self-help and retaliation." 416 U.S. at
605.
29. 416 U.S. at 616-17; see La. Code Civ. Pro. Ann. art. 3501 (West 1961).
30. "Mitchell turned to a balancing test and repudiated elements of [Fuentes] which had been
described as establishing 'a Procrustean rule of a prior adversary hearing' as a due process
prerequisite to prejudgment creditor remedies." 1973 Term 72 (footnotes omitted).
31. 416 U.S. at 616-18; see text accompanying note 47 infra.
32. 416 U.S. at 605.
33. Id. at 615; Note, Repossession of Fuentes 85. "[F]lorida law automatically relies on the
bare assertion of the party seeking the writ that he is entitled to one and allows a court clerk to
issue the writ summarily." Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 74 (1972).
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issue only upon a judge's authorization; 34 in Fuentes the writ of replevin was
issued on the order of the clerk of the court-35 Third and fourth, under the
Louisiana statute the attaching creditor was required to post bond and the
debtor could regain possession by posting a counterbond. 36 In Fuentes, both
the Florida and the Pennsylvania statute required a creditor's bond, but only
the Pennsylvania procedure allowed a debtor's counterbond to regain possession. 37 Finally, the Louisiana statute entitled the debtor to obtain immediate
dissolution of the writ unless the creditor proved "the existence of the debt,
lien, and delinquency, failing which the court may order return of the
property and assess damages in favor of the debtor, including attorney's
fees." ' 38 In Fuentes, the Florida statute provided that the debtor "eventually"
would be given a hearing; the Pennsylvania statute did not require that there
"ever be [an] opportunity for a hearing on the merits of the conflicting claims
39
to possession of the replevied property.
Despite the plurality's multifaceted attempt to distinguish Fuentes, both the
concurring and dissenting opinions in Mitchell believed that the prior decision
had been overruled.4 0 Taking issue with the Court's analysis, Justice Stewart,
in his dissent, adhered to the Fuentes doctrine:
Matters such as requirements for the posting of bond and the filing of sworn factual
allegations, the length and severity of the deprivation, the relative simplicity of the
issues underlying the creditor's claim to possession, and the comparative "importance"
or "necessity" of the goods involved [in Fuentes] were held to be relevant to
determining the form of notice and hearing to be provided, but not to the constitutional need for notice and an opportunity for a hearing of some kind."
Thus, the Mitchell Court was divided as to the necessity for prior notice
and hearing. By upholding a procedure which lacked both of these
safeguards, Mitchell raised but did not resolve questions concerning the
extent of its departure from prior law. 42 The anticipated thrust of Mitchell
43
was that of a return to a flexible analysis of prejudgment seizures. To reach
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

416 U.S. at 605-06.
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 74 (1972).
416 U.S. at 606-07.
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 73-77 nn.6 & 7 (1972).
416 U.S. at 606.
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 75, 77 (1972).

40. "[rMhe Court today has unmistakably overruled a considered decision of this Court that is
barely two years old ... "416 U.S. at 635 (Stewart, J., dissenting). "I think it fair to say that the
Fuentes opinion is overruled." Id. at 623 (Powell, J., concurring).
41. Id. at 630-31 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
42. "Whether Fuentes' interpretation of the fourteenth amendment can be successfully refuted
in favor of utilitarian balancing was not resolved by the Mitchell opinion ...." 1973 Term 79.
43.

Quoting Cafeteria Workers, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961), and Stanley

v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 650 (1972), Mitchell stated: "The very nature of due process negates any
concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation." 416 U.S. at
610. "The more significant import of the Mitchell decision is its reaffirmation of a flexible
procedural due process analysis." Ruocco v. Brinker, 380 F. Supp. 432, 437 (S.D. Fla. 1974). For
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this end, Mitchell appeared to pose an alternative to the prior notice and
hearing requirements set forth in Fuentes. Accordingly, some courts interpreted the opinion as illustrative of a flexible approach under which varying
procedures other than notice and hearing could sufficiently preserve the basic
fairness necessary in the extension of due process. For example, a district
court, finding three of the five Mitchell criteria present, upheld an attachment
statute in Woods v. Tennessee4 4 and refused to treat the absence of two
safeguards as sufficiently substantial to render the procedure unconstitutional.
A second possible interpretation was that Mitchell established a five-point test
against which similar statutes were to be strictly judged. Illustrative of this
"strict compliance" view is a mechanical approach which invalidates statutes
although all but one of Mitchell's criteria are present, as was done in Sugar
v. Curtis Circulation Co. 45

In North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc. ,46 the Court, again per
Justice White, appeared to take the narrow view of Mitchell's procedural
alternative. In so doing, the unusually brief decision dispelled the impression
that Mitchell had so undercut Fuentes as to overrule it sub silentio. 47 This
was immediately apparent in the Court's application of Fuentes as predominant authority. In an analysis similar to that of Justice Stewart's dissent in
Mitchell,4 8 the majority in Di-Chem separated out of Fuentes those factors
which are determinative of the right to a hearing, as compared to those
determinative only of the hearing's form:
Although the length or severity of a deprivation of use or possession would be another
factor to weigh in determining the appropriate form of hearing, [in Fuentes this] was
not deemed to be determinative of the right to a hearing of some sort. Because the
official seizures had been carried out without notice and without opportunity for a
an analysis supporting this "flexible" view of Mitchell, see 6 Seton Hall L. Rev. 150, 162-64
(1974).
44. 378 F. Supp. 1364 (W.D. Tenn. 1974) (no debtor counterbond or immediate post
attachment hearing). "Under the balancing test of the [Mitchell] majority, it is unclear which of
the factors the Court found relevant must coexist to protect ex parte creditor remedies from
constitutional attack. . . . The [Mitchell] majority's itemization of particular factors which may
validate such statutes suggests that the opinion may have been directed primarily toward the
legislatures of those several states whose summary creditor remedies have been invalidated under
Fuentes and remain invalid under the holding of Mitchell." 1973 Term 82 (footnote omitted).
45. 383 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), prob. juris. noted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3550 (U.S. Apr. 15,
1975) (No. 74-859); see Guzman v. Western State Bank, No. 74-1740 (8th Cir., March I1, 1975),
vacating 381 F. Supp. 1262 (D.N.D. 1974); Garcia v. Krausse, 380 F. Supp. 1254 (S.D. Tex.
1974). The Guzman and the Garcia analyses, however, are similar to that employed in North Ga.
Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 95 S. Ct. 719 (1975). In Sugar, supra, the court mechanically
struck down a statute which met all criteria except the one requiring an immediate post-seizure
hearing. The decision has been criticized, see McLaughlin, Attachment Statute Unconstitutional-Wholly or in Part?, 172 N.Y.L.J., Nov. 8, 1974, at 1, col. 1.
46. 95 S. Ct. 719 (1975).
47. Referring to the decision of the Georgia Supreme Court, Justice White's opinion for the
majority stated: "This approach failed to take account of Fuentes v. Shevin, . . . a case decided
by this Court more than a year prior to the Georgia court's decision." Id. at 722.
48. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
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hearing or other safeguard against mistaken repossession [the statutes in Fuentes] were
held to be in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.4 9

Concurring briefly in Di-Chem, Justice Stewart simply noted that his report
of Fuentes' "demise" had been "greatly exaggerated."50 In light of his Mitchell
dissent, Justice Stewart would appear to concur with the Di-Chem statement
that the "length and severity" of a deprivation are only determinative of the
hearing's form. However, Di-Chem conspicuously did not adopt Justice
Stewart's sentiments that the posting of bond, the sworn affidavit containing
specific facts, the relative simplicity of the issues and the comparative
importance of the goods involved also go to the issue of the hearing's form. s '
Instead, Di-Chem employed, as the second part of the constitutional inquiry,
the five specific factors discussed in Mitchell. As in Mitchell, these factors
were analyzed to determine whether the Georgia garnishment procedure
provided the debtor with sufficient safeguards as to afford him due process
2

without granting him prior notice and hearing.The Georgia statute in Di-Chem did provide for the creditor's affidavit;
however, that affidavit required only conclusory allegations. s 3 Although the
statute also provided for a debtor's posting of bond "to dissolve the garnishment,"' 5 4 and for the posting of a bond by the creditor in a sum double the
amount sworn to be due, 55 the remaining two safeguards identified in
Mitchell-a judge's granting of the writ and an immediate post-seizure
hearing-were totally absent. Thus, the statute in Di-Chem was struck down
for failure to meet three of the five criteria set forth in Mitchell.
For this reason, it remains unclear whether due process demands full or
only partial compliance with the Mitchell alternative. Had the Georgia
procedure contained three factors similar to those approved in Mitchell, it is
possible that the Court would have upheld the statute. S 6 If the Georgia
49. 95 S. Ct. at 722 (emphasis added). The reference to "other safeguard" appears to be an
attempt to harmonize Fuentes with Mitchell. However, it is doubtful that the Fuentes Court
would have allowed anything but a notice and hearing. See text accompanying notes 18-26 supra.
50. "It is gratifying to note that my report of the demise of Fuentes v. Shevin ... seems to
have been greatly exaggerated. Cf. S. Clemens, Cable from Europe to the Associated Press,
reprinted in II A. Paine, Mark Twain: A Biography 1039 (1912)." 95 S. CL at 723 (Stewart, J.,
concurring); see note 40 supra.
51. See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 630-31 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting). In
Mitchell, the relative simplicity of the issues underlying the creditor's claim to possession aided
the Court in its decision that the Louisiana statute had minimized the risk of any unjust
deprivation to the debtor. Id. at 617-18. In Di-Chem, "the comparative 'importance' or'necessity'
of the goods involved" was considered irrelevant to the issue of whether there should be prior
notice or hearing: "We are no more inclined now than we have been in the past to distinguish
among different kinds of property in applying the Due Process Clause." 95 S. CL at 723 (citing
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. at 89-90).
52. Compare 95 S. CL at 722-23 with Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. at 616-20.
53. 95 S. CL at 722; see note 1 supra.
54. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
55.

See note 2 supra.

56. This was the situation before the court in Woods v. Tennessee, 378 F. Supp. 1364 tW.D.
Tenn. 1974), discussed in text accompanying note 44 supra.
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statute in Di-Chern had lacked only one of the five criteria, but had been
struck down nevertheless, then the decision would have indicated that
Mitchell was indeed a test demanding strict compliance.5 7 Put another way, it
is apparent that Di-Chem was far from the best possible set of facts with
which to clarify Mitchell. However, the opinion's treatment of Fuentes as the
applicable rule and its mechanical approach to Mitchell appear to push the
decision towards the strict compliance view.
While concurring in the Court's decision, Justice Powell did not approve of
Di-Chem's reasoning, stating that it swept "more broadly than necessary and
appear[ed] to resuscitate [Fuentes]."58 Justice Powell examined the postSniadach "expansion of concepts of procedural due process" and urged "a
more careful assessment of the nature of the governmental function served by
the challenged procedure and of the costs the procedure exacts of private
interests. '5 9 Doubting whether Fuentes struck a proper balance, and whether
Mitchell should be relegated to its facts in this "more careful assessment,"
Justice Powell offered his own three-point procedural alternative. It was
similar to that set forth in Mitchell. 6 The first requirement would be a
creditor's bond; the second requirement would provide for a creditor's "establishment before a neutral officer of a factual basis of the need to resort to the
remedy."'61 Third, Justice Powell would require a post-seizure hearing. 62
Since his second and third requirements were absent in the Georgia statute,
Justice Powell would have found the garnishment procedure unconstitutional
'63
due to its failure to afford "fundamental fairness.
In their dissent, Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist assailed the Di-Chem
majority on five principal grounds. First, the dissent relegated Sniadach to
the "environment" of wages. Admitting that Sniadach had been expanded by
Fuentes, the dissent asserted that this expansion was disapproved by Mitchell. 64 Second, the dissent adhered to a flexible construction of Mitchell's
thrust, viewing that decision as "substantially" retreating from Fuentes. 65
57. See note 45 supra.
58. 95 S. Ct. at 723 (Powell, J., concurring).
59. Id. at 724 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell based his proposal almost solely upon
the authority of two cases, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263-66 (1970) (see text accompanying
notes 14-17 supra) and Cafeteria Workers, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)
(governmental interest in national security overrides defense plant employee's interest in pre-firing
hearing). Beyond their common endorsement of a balancing test, these two cases are quite
dissimilar; neither dealt with prejudgment remedies. See note 15 supra.
60. Compare Justice Powell's opinion with Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 605-07
(1974).
61. 95 S. Ct. at 725 (Powell, J.,concurring) (footnote omitted). The concept of a "neutral
officer" as central to the issue of adequate safeguards finds support in Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 616
("The Louisiana law provides for judicial control of the process from beginning to end.").
62. 95 S.Ct. at 725 (Powell, J.,concurring).
63. Id.at 726.
64. Id. at 726-27 (Blackmun & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting). While both Sniadach and
Di-Chem dealt with garnishment statutes, the Di-Chem procedure did not involve wages. See
note 2 supra.
65. "I would have thought that, whatever Fuentes may have stood for in this area of
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Third, the dissent introduced a new argument by collaterally attacking the
Court's four-to-three decision in Fuentes on the ground "that the practice of
the Court 'except in cases of absolute necessity' is not to decide a constitutional question unless there is a majority 'of the whole court.' "66 Fourth, the
67
dissent emphasized that the present dispute was between two corporations
and found that the Georgia system provided sufficient protection in this
commercial setting. 68 Indeed, this factor was totally ignored by the majority.
Finally, the dissent criticized the Court for having "embarked on a case-bycase analysis. . . of the respective state statutes in this area. That road is a
long and unrewarding one, and provides no satisfactory answers to issues of
constitutional magnitude. '69 These five arguments appear to reflect a desire to
preserve the flexible view thatMitchell'sfive procedural safeguards are not an
exclusive test but are examples
of sufficient debtor protection in the absence
70
of prior notice and hearing.
The thrust of the Supreme Court decisions leads to the basic proposition
that there must be a preservation of judicial control over the initial decision
whether or not to issue the ex parte writ. The exercise of this judicial
discretion would turn upon whether or not there exist statutory safeguards
adequate to protect the debtor's property interest in the absence of prior
notice and hearing. Although five safeguards were isolated in Mitchell, it is
as yet an unwarranted assumption that Louisiana's garnishment law constitutes the sole configuration of statutory provisions constitutionally permissible
absent notice and hearing. Therefore, the Court in future decisions should
adopt a qualitative rather than a quantitative construction of Mitchell.
Under such a qualitative standard, a mechanical application of Mitchell
would be unwarranted. Assuming arguendo that the Court might accept a
statute meeting three of the five Mitchell criteria, the crucial factors are not
the specific forms in which the safeguards manifest themselves; rather, what
is important is the substantive protection afforded the debtor. Thus, a
creditor's bond or a creditor's non-conclusory affidavit, since both are directed
at imposing a personal risk on the creditor seeking an extraordinary ex parte
remedy, may be sufficient, assuming other substantive protections are afdebtor-creditor commercial relationships, with its 4-3 vote by a bobtailed court, it was substantially cut back by Mitchell." 95 S. Ct. at 727 (Blackmun & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
66. Id. at 727, quoting Briscoe v. Commonwealth Bank, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 118, 122 (1834); see
note 19 supra and accompanying text.
67. See D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972) (summary seizure after waiver
of corporation's right to prejudgment notice and hearing on advice of counsel during contractual
negotiations with another corporation did not violate due process).
68. 95 S. Ct. at 729 (Blackmun & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
69. Id. Even before the decision in Di-Chem, one commentator suggested that Mitchell would
require a case-by-case clarification. Phillips, Revolution and Counterrevolution: The Supreme
Court on Creditors' Remedies, 3 Fordham Urban L.J. 1, 10-11 (1974).
70. The dissent appeared to place too great an emphasis on the Court's employment of
Sniadach, which was but superficially dealt with by the majority; see 95 S. Ct. at 722. In
addition, the dissent failed to explicate Mitchell and its approach would also seem to require a
case-by-case analysis.
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forded. Similarly, at least in some circumstances (particularly commercial
ones), posting a counterbond in order to recover the seized property may
obviate the necessity of an immediate post-seizure hearing. Perhaps one can
read Justice Powell's concurrence in Di-Chem as supporting this view. In any
event, in the context of careful supervision by a judge, almost any form of
71
safeguards of such quality should be constitutionally adequate.
Putting aside the theoretical analysis involved in the struggle to ascertain
coherence between Fuentes, Mitchell and Di-Chem, the fact remains that the
area of procedural due process as applied to prejudgment remedies is confusing and unsettled. After Mitchell, the Court had the option to treat the
procedural alternative proposed in that case as an example of a more flexible
approach to creditors' remedies. On the other hand, the Di-Chem Court could
have viewed Mitchell as a test and, therefore, a narrow exception to the still
vital authority of Fuentes. Due to the factual setting of Di-Chem-the
absence of three of the five safeguards identified in Mitchell-it remains
unclear which option the Supreme Court has elected. Perhaps the most that
can be said with certainty is that Fuentes continues to exert significant
authority. Although Mitchell has offered an alternative to what was once a
blanket rule, the extent and effect of that alternative will remain unclear
unless future decisions are more enlightening than Di-Chem. Barring another
about face, a case-by-case analysis appears unavoidable.
Michael W. Hogan

Labor Law-Arbitrability-In-Course Termination of Collective Bargaining Agreement Presents Issue for Judicial Resolution.-In 1972
plaintiff union and defendant Rainbow Plastics entered into a collective
bargaining agreement which was to expire on November 18, 1974. The
grievance clause mandated arbitration as a final remedy for "complaint[s]
pertaining to the interpretation or application of the terms of [the collective
bargaining] agreement."*' During negotiations Rainbow advised the union
that it was considering closing one of the plants covered by the agreement,
and moving some of the site's operations to a new location. Prior to the
shutdown, the parties entered into a separate letter agreement covering the
effects of the move upon the unionized employees. 2 By its terms, the letter
71. This view is supported by Mitchell's final footnote, where the Court sought to minimize
the impact of its decision on replevin statutes held unconstitutional under Fuentes: "Nor Is it at
all clear, with an exception or two, that the reported cases invalidating replevin or similar
statutes dealt with situations where there was judicial supervision of seizure or foreclosure from
the outset." 416 U.S. at 620 n.14.

* As this Case Note went to press, the principal case was reported in 508 F.2d 1309, as
indicated in the text. All footnote citations are to L.R.R.M.
1. UAW Local 125 v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 88 L.R.R.M. 2213, 2215 n.4 (8th Cir.,
Jan. 8, 1975).
2.

Id. at 2214-15.
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agreement "represent[ed] the full and final agreement between the parties and
include[d] all matters discussed regarding the shut down of the Rainbow
Plastics operation and the termination of the agreement and the effects of
such shut down on the employees included in the bargaining unit .... -3
Shortly after the opening of the new plant, the union filed grievances on
behalf of some of the twenty-seven workers transferred there. After Rainbow
rejected the grievances and refused arbitration, the union brought suit to
compel arbitration. The district court found the letter agreement ambiguous
and directed that the question of whether the letter agreement terminated the
collective bargaining agreement be determined by an arbitrator. 4 The Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that regardless of the
degree of ambiguity involved, the question of termination of collective
bargaining agreements was for judicial resolution. s UAW Local 125 v. International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., 508 F.2d 1309 (8th Cir. 1975)
[hereinafter cited as Rainbow].
Under federal labor policy, arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement with an arbitration clause has been the preferred method of settling6
labor disputes. This policy was first developed in the Steelworkers Trilogy
which defined the initial role of a court as "confined to ascertaining whether
the party seeking arbitration is making a claim which on its face is governed
by the contract,"17 rather than as encompassing the resolution of the dispute
on its merits. Under this policy, the actual interpretation of the contract is
reserved to the arbitrator. 8 A court must avoid evaluating the substantive
provisions of a contract "even through the back door of interpreting the
arbitration clause, when the alternative is to utilize the services of an
arbitrator." 9 Although the scope of a court's power appears limited in this
area, it must decide "whether or not [a party is] bound to arbitrate... on the
basis of the contract entered into by the parties."' 0 The apparent contradiction'1 is overcome through a judicial construction of the collective bargaining
3. Id. at 2215-16.
4. See id. at 2216.
5. Id. at 2217.
6. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American
Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
7. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960).
8. Id. at 569; United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599
(1960).
9. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 585 (1960); cf. Tobacco
Workers Local 317 v. Lorillard Corp., 448 F.2d 949 (4th Cir. 1971) in which the court said "the
judge must determine whether there is an agreement to arbitrate and whether that agreement has
been breached.... []e must take care to steer clear of the questions that the parties have agreed
to settle through the arbitrator. If he does not, he becomes an instrument of a breach of the
agreement." Id. at 957.
10. Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238, 241 (1962).
11. See Tobacco Workers Local 317 v. Lorillard Corp., 448 F.2d 949, 955 (4th Cir. 1971)
(arbitration ordered over company objection that grievance provisions precluded award of
remedy sought, on theory that the limitation was not on arbitrability but on arbitrator's power to
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agreement based on a "presumption of arbitrability"' 2 of grievances under the
contract. The presumption serves to protect the integrity of the agreement
and further the policy favoring arbitration. 13 Disputes which the parties wish
to exclude from the grievance procedures must be specifically set out as
non-arbitrable in the agreement. "A collective-bargaining agreement cannot

define every.minute aspect of the complex and continuing relationship between the parties. Arbitration provides a method for resolving the unforeseen
' 14
disagreements that inevitably arise."
While arbitration clauses have been presumed to cover substantive issues of
contract interpretation,I s they have rarely been viewed as empowering an
fashion an award); International Union of Elec. Workers v. General Elec. Co., 407 F.2d 253,
264-66 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 904 (1969) (the court's position is "treacherous"
where commitment to arbitration itself is questioned in face of relatively unambiguous facts, as
distinguished from case in which commitment to arbitration is clear but facts are not); McDermott, Arbitrability: The Courts Versus The Arbitrator, 23 Arb. J. 18, 26-29 (1968); Meltzer, The
Supreme Court, Arbitrability and Collective Bargaining, 28 U. Chi. L. Rev. 464, 475-76 (1961).
12. Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 377 (1974). See generally Gould, The
Supreme Court and Labor Law: An Analysis of Recent Trends and Developments, 16 W.
Reserve L. Rev. 819 (1965); Jones, The Name of the Game Is Decision-Some Reflections on
"Arbitrability" and "Authority" in Labor Arbitration, 46 Texas L. Rev. 865 (1968); McDermott,
Arbitrability: The Courts Versus The Arbitrator, 23 Arb. J. 18 (1968); Smith, Arbitrability-The
Arbitrator, The Courts and The Parties, 17 Arb. J. 3 (1962).
The proper effect of a court order compelling arbitration on the power of an arbitrator to
determine arbitrability has been disputed. Compare Claremont Painting & Decorating Co. v.
Painters Local 144, 66-2 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 1 8423, at 4451 (after court orders arbitration,
redetermination by arbitrator would "disrupt the allocation of function and responsibility
between court and arbitrator") with J.C. Wattenbarger & Sons v. Teamsters Local 87, 66-2 CCH
Lab. Arb. Awards
8626, at 5143-44 (parties may contest arbitrability before arbitrator after
court orders arbitration). A judicial decision on arbitrability, however, is not dispositive of the
merits of the dispute.
13. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Howmet Corp., 466 F.2d 1249, 1256 (9th Cir. 1972)
("flexible nature of... arbitration . . . requires that the arbitrator be given as much freedom as
possible-from the framing of the issues themselves to the fashioning of appropriate remedies");
Tobacco Workers Local 317 v. Lorillard Corp., 448 F.2d 949, 955 (4th Cir. 1971) (presumption of
arbitrability carried question of exclusion of remedy to the arbitrator "in order to receive 'the
benefit of the arbitrator's interpretive skills as to . . . his contractual authority.' ") (quoting
Torrington Co. v. Metal Prod. Workers Local 1645, 362 F.2d 677, 680 n.6 (2d Cir. 1966)). In
International Union of Elec. Workers v. General Elec. Co., 407 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 904 (1969) the court said that in the absence of a presumption of arbitrability "In
order to decide whether a case is arbitrable, a court would have to try it on the merits." Id. at
259. "When an arbitration clause begins to resemble a trust indenture, one wonders what gain
there is for either party in agreeing to arbitrate at all, other than the questionable joys of
litigation." Id. at 258.
14. Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 378 (1974).
15. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960)
(arbitration should be denied only where "it may be said with positive assurance that the
arbitration dause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute'); cf.
Drake Bakeries Inc. v. Local 50, Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. 254, 258-59 (1962) (Court rejected
contention that "parties cannot have intended to arbitrate so fundamental a matter as a union
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arbitrator to determine the threshold question of arbitrability 6 "unless the
parties clearly state to the contrary."'1 7 When contract termination is at issue
courts have viewed the problem as one reserved for the judiciary, and not the
arbitrator. 18 This result seems to be based on an assumption that an arbitrator is not competent to decide questions involving threshold determinastrike"); International Union of Elec. Workers v. General Elec. Co., 407 F.2d 253, 259 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 904 (1969) (the application of a clause overriding the presumption of
arbitrability would have to be specifically designated to be effective, if in light of national labor
policy it could be given effect at all); A.S. Abell Co. v. Baltimore Typo. Union, 338 F.2d 190,
193-94 (4th Cir. 1964) (bargaining history is insufficient to meet Warrior test requiring forceful
evidence to rebut presumption of arbitrability). See also Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire
Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 409-12 (d Cir. 1959), petition for cert. dismissed, 364 U.S. 801
(1960) (claim of fraud in inducement of entire contract contemplated by broad arbitration
provisions).
16. See Associated Milk Dealers, Inc. v. Milk Drivers Local 753, 422 F.2d 546, 550 (7th Cir.
1970) ("The party claiming that arbitrability is for the arbitrator to decide bears the burden of
proof and must show that the contract clearly manifests such an intention ....');cf. Necchi
S.p.A. v. Necchi Sewing Mach. Sales Corp., 348 F.2d 693, 696 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383
U.S. 909 (1966) (arbitration of arbitrability is proper only where arbitration provision is "so
unusually broad that it clearly vests the arbitrators with the power to resolve questions of
arbitrability as well as the merits ....
However arbitrability is normally for the arbitrator in the
different sense that his finding that a grievance lacks merit is a decision that the dispute is
non-arbitrable"); see Aaron, Judicial Intervention in Labor Arbitration, 20 Stan. L. Rev. 41, 43
(1967); Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 Calif. L Rev. 663,
801 n.537 (1973). See also Jones, The Name of the Game Is Decision-Some Reflections on
"Arbitrability" and "Authority" in Labor Arbitration, 46 Texas L. Rev. 865 (1968); Note,
Mid-Term Modification of Terms and Conditions of Employment, 1972 Duke L.J. 813, 827-28.
Some arbitrators have found the question of arbitrability to be within their authority where the
arbitration provisions of the collective bargaining agreement have been very broad. See Master
Builders Ass'n v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 66-1 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards S 8120 (1965)
(assuming that arbitrability is for the court gives "either party the power to completely frustrate
the whole purpose and intent of the arbitration section." Id. at 3445. "If the contract arbitrator is
to fulfill his obligations under this agreement, he must assume the responsibility of determining if
any given dispute between the parties is an arbitrable question." Id. at 3446). See also Fleming,
Arbitrators and Arbitrability, 1963 Wash. U.L.Q. 200.
17. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 571 (1960) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
18. Oil Workers Int'l Union v. American Maize Prod. Co., 492 F.2d 409, 411-12 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974) (court found notice went to termination rather than amendment
of the collective bargaining agreement); M.K. & 0. Transit Lines, Inc. v. Division 892, Street
Employees, 319 F.2d 488, 491 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 944 (1963) (court found
"arbitration of the question of termination [was] ... clearly precluded by the agreement" which
contained automatic renewal provisions); UMW Dist. 22 v. Roncco, 314 F.2d 186, 188 (10th
Cir. 1963) (arbitration, "the contractual 'remedy,' [cannot be ordered] until the issue before the
court as to [the contract's] very existence is settled"); Pullman, Inc. v. International Bhd. of
Boilermakers, 354 F. Supp. 496, 499 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (under collective bargaining agreement with
automatic renewal provisions, "[d]etermination of a question of contract law, such as duration,
which is devoid of any labor law consideration, is uniquely the province of a court rather than of
an arbitrator"). See also Los Angeles Newspaper Guild Local 69 v. Hearst Corp., 504 F.2d 636,
641 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3571 (U.S. Apr. 21, 1975).
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tions as well as a presumption that an arbitrator should not have the
authority to define the scope of his own power. 19 ,
When a claim for arbitration is met with the argument that the contract has
terminated, difficult questions arise. Courts generally lave failed to distinguish in-course termination 20 (termination by election by a party to the
collective bargaining agreement)2 1 from end of term expiration of such
agreements (termination by lapse of time). 22 The presumption that courts,
rather than arbitrators, decide issues involving in-course termination usually
has been applied.
It is arguable that the judicial reluctance to submit in-course termination
disputes to arbitrators, even where the arbitration clause is broad, ignores
several Supreme Court cases dealing with arbitrators' power to determine the
arbitrability of a grievance. In John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 2 3 the
company alleged that the union grievances were not arbitrable because of a
failure to fulfill the procedural prerequisites to arbitration required by the
grievance provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. The Court held
the question to be for the arbitrator since the question of compliance with
procedural prerequisites "cannot ordinarily be answered without consideration of the merits of the dispute. '2 4 In Local 150, AFL-CIO v. FlairBuilders,
Inc., 25 the Court declined to decide whether a defense to arbitration was
arbitrable as " 'necessarily involv[ing] a determination of the merits,' "26 but
found arbitration of the issue of laches contemplated by the collective
bargaining agreement.
Wiley and Flair may herald a shift in the presumptions concerning
threshold questions generally. The proper degree of judicial interpretation of
a collective bargaining agreement involves questions to which "[n]eat logical
19. See, e.g., Oil Workers Int'l Union v. American Maize Prod. Co., 492 F.2d 409, 411 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974); ILGWU v. Ashland Indus., Inc., 488 F.2d 641, 644 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 840 (1974); Local 998, UAW v. B. & T. Metals Co., 315 F.2d 432,
436-37 (6th Cir. 1963); Pullman, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 354 F. Supp. 496,
499 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
20. But see Local 998, UAW v. B. & T. Metals Co., 315 F.2d 432 (6th Cir. 1963) which
analogized expiration to termination. The same legal question is presented although "the question
of the existence of the contract at the time when the grievances occurred depends upon facts
occurring subsequent to the original execution of the contract instead of upon facts existing at tile
time of the execution of the contract." Id. at 436.
21. See, e.g., Oil Workers Int'l Union v. American Maize Prod. Co., 492 F.2d 409, 411 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974); M.K. & 0. Transit Lines, Inc. v. Division 892, Street
Employees, 319 F.2d 488, 489 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 944 (1963).
22. See Teamsters Local 249 v. Kroger Co., 411 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1969) (per curiam).
23. 376 U.S. 543 (1964); see Note, Procedural Arbitrability Under Section 301 of the LMRA,
73 Yale L.J. 1459 (1964).
24. 376 U.S. at 557; see Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 115-16 (1945) (Rutledge,
J., dissenting) (decisions regarding procedural rights may determine substantive rights).
25. 406 U.S. 487 (1972).
26. Id. at 490, quoting Brief for Petitioner. But see Amalgamated Clothing Workers v.
Ironall Factories Co., 386 F.2d 586, 591-92 (6th Cir. 1967).
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distinctions do not provide the answer. "27 In approving arbitration of general
defenses not expressly derived from the terms of the contract, Flair broadens
the scope of arbitrator functions. The Wiley rationale 28 has been applied,
under authority of Flair, to the question of repudiation which was held
arbitrable since it "necessarily requires an interpretation of the meaning of the
contract and the intent of the parties." 29 The decision in Flair emphasizes
how the jurisdiction of the courts has been markedly circumscribed by the
Steelworkers Trilogy. As the dissent in Flairpointed out, that decision raised
a question whether other affirmative defenses, e.g., fraud and duress, may be
considered by a court-30 The Rainbow decision seems contrary to the spirit of
Flair, and illustrates the problems a court faces when it precludes arbitrability of an in-course termination defense to a suit to compel arbitration of
grievances.
In Rainbow, the court conceded that "the letter agreement is not so
unequivocal as to call for a ruling that as a matter of law the parties intended
a termination of all rights under the collective bargaining agreement." 3'
Nevertheless, it rejected the proposition that "where there is ambiguous
language relating to an alleged termination, the threshold issue of contract
32
expiration or termination should be submitted to arbitration." The court
cited five cases to support its position. However, each of these decisions is
factually distinguishable. 33 Moreover, as the court itself conceded, issues of
27. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 572 (1960) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
28. There arbitration was warranted because "[q]uestions concerning the procedural prerequisites to arbitration do not arise in a vacuum; they develop in the context of an actual dispute

about the rights of the parties to the contract or those covered by iL" 376 U.S. at 556-57; see
Rochester Tel. Corp. v. Communications Workers, 340 F.2d 237, 239 (2d Cir. 1965) (per curiam)
("We do not ... read ... Wiley to say that procedural defenses fall to the arbitrator only if
factually related to the merits of the dispute . . .
29. General Dynamics Corp. v. Local 5, Marine Workers, 469 F.2d 848, 853 (1st Cir. 1972);
see H & M Cake Box, Inc. v. Bakery Workers Local 45, 493 F.2d 1226, 1227 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 839 (1974). But see 6A A. Corbin, Contracts § 1443 at 434-35 (1962).
30. 406 U.S. at 497 (Powell, J., dissenting); see note 42 infra.
31. 88 L.R1RM. at 2216.
32. Id.
33. Oil Workers InVl Union v. American Maize Prod. Co., 492 F.2d 409, 411 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974) (issue involving termination by notice under collective agreement
containing automatic renewal provisions is for the judiciary); ILGWU v. Ashland Indus., Inc.,
488 F.2d 641, 644-45 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 840 (1974) (issue of fraud in inducement of
collective agreement is for the judiciary); Local 998, UAW v. B. & T. Metals Co., 315 F.2d 432,
436 (6th Cir. 1963) (issue involving termination by notice under collective agreement with
automatic renewal provisions is for the judiciary); UMW Dist. 22 v. Roncco, 314 F.2d 186,
187-88 (10th Cir. 1963) (issue of cancellation of contract is for the judiciary); Procter & Gamble
Indep. Union v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 312 F.2d 181, 184 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 374
U.S. 830 (1963) (termination by notice under collective agreement having automatic renewal
provisions is for the judiciary). In-course termination, however, may involve the same determinations as notice of termination under agreements with automatic renewal provisions.
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contract termination have been submitted
to arbitrators in situations not
34
dissimilar to the one before the court.

As a second ground for its holding, the court reasoned that the issue of
termination depended on a construction of the letter agreement, which had no
arbitration clause, and not on a construction of the pre-existing collective
bargaining agreement. Since the bargaining agreement confined itself to
"interpretation or application of the terms of this agreement," the court
refused to find any basis upon which to vest in an arbitrator the power to
determine the effect of the letter agreement. 35 This reasoning is subject to
criticism. The collective bargaining agreement itself defined how the agreement could be terminated. 36 The dispute over whether the letter agreement
terminated the collective bargaining agreement arguably should be determined by reference to the grievance provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement. 3 7 Thus, termination might not have rested solely on construction
of the letter agreement, as the court stated that it did; the arbitration clause
might have been construed to cover interpretation and application of the
subsequent letter agreement.
A second issue raised in Rainbow was whether the original collective
agreement had any applicability at the new location. The court viewed the
issue presented as "whether [the letter agreement] terminated the collective
bargaining agreement or whether the letter agreement and the bargaining
34. In Local 4, Elec. Workers v. Radio Thirteen-Eighty, Inc., 469 F.2d 610, 614 (8th Cir.
1972) the court ordered arbitration of question of termination under a collective agreement having
a broad arbitration clause and substantive provisions "vaguely and ambiguously" applying to
termination of the agreement. The court distinguished B. & T. Metals and Procter & Gamble as
involving conduct subsequent to express expiration dates and found "the position taken in these
cases, resolving the construction of ambiguous terms in bargaining agreements in favor of
nonarbitration, is at variance with the approach in cases decided by this court." Id. at 615.
35. 88 L.R.R.M. at 2217.
36. The collective agreement had automatic renewal provisions which allowed termination to
be effective after November 17, 1974 upon sixty days prior written notice. See UAW Local 125 v.
International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 85 L.R.R.M. 2721, 2723 (D. Minn. 1974), rev'd, 88 L.R.R.M.
2213 (8th Cir., Jan. 8, 1975).
37. The relationship between the two agreements is arguably sufficient without an express
presumption of arbitrability of the question of termination. See Local 4, Elec. Workers v. Radio
Thirteen-Eighty, Inc., 469 F.2d 610 (8th Cir. 1972) (arbitration of termination where substantive
terms arguably provide for termination on condition); Davis v. Pro Basketball, Inc., 87
L.R.R.M. 2285 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (employment contract providing for arbitration of interpretation, application and compliance found to apply to subsequent "modification of agreement"
providing for termination of contract upon occurrence of condition; claim of termination under
subsequent modification of agreement held arbitrable); cf. Amalgamated Clothing Workers v.
Ironall Factories Co., 386 F.2d 586, 590-91 (6th Cir. 1967) (dispute over whether agreement
subsequent to execution of collective agreement settled dispute over wages held arbitrable under
collective agreement providing for arbitration of disputes arising out of or relating to the
agreement or its interpretation). But cf. District 2, Marine Eng'rs Ass'n v. Falcon Carriers, Inc.,
374 F. Supp. 1342, 1347-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (dispute over side agreement partly conflicting with
terms of collective agreement does not relate to an interpretation, construction or application of
the collective agreement).
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agreement together articulate the rights of the... workers ....

'38

The court

went on to conclude that, "[u]nder these circumstances, the question of the
geographic limitation of the collective... agreement is not separable from the
overall question of contract termination but, rather . . . the two issues are
inextricably intertvined." 39 The court directed the district court that on
remand "the geographic limitation language in the bargaining agreement
should be taken into account as evidence. . . bearing on the question of...
[termination]. ' 40 Thus, the court conceded that interpretation of the bargaining agreement was essential to decide the termination issue, and also, in
effect, ordered the district court to become fully enmeshed in the merits of the
case. As a result, it became involved in the very issues which the Supreme
Court consistently has viewed as most suitable for arbitration.
In light of Wiley and Flair the question of the arbitrability of in-course
termination should be re-examined. The problem of satisfaction of procedural
prerequisites to arbitration would seem to involve the same investigation into
the merits and relationships under a collective bargaining agreement as
questions concerning in-course termination. 41 Questions going to the arbitrator's power to arbitrate a grievance need not, as "legal" in nature, 42 be
38. 88 L.RRIM. at 2218.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. In many cases, especially where the arbitration clause is limited, no clear line can be
drawn between interpretation of substantive and remedial provisions of a collective agreement for
the purpose of delimiting the separate domains of court and arbitrator. In such cases, arguably,
the decision as to arbitrability is a function of the strength of the presumption applied and the
proximity to a threshold issue. See International Union of Elec. Workers v. General Elec. Co.,
407 F.2d 253, 266 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 904 (1969) (question of arbitrability
involved "motive and manner of enforcing a 'rule' "); Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire
Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 410 (2d Cir. 1959) ("difference between fraud in the inducement and
mere failure of performance [of a contract] depends upon little more than legal verbiage and the
formulation of legal conclusions").
42. The dissent in Flair felt that affirmative defenses to the enforceability of contracts were
"issues within the traditional equity jurisdiction of courts of law" and therefore issues which
courts are better qualified to decide. 406 U.S. at 497 (Powell, J., dissenting). Some courts have
extended the presumption of arbitrability to similar threshold questions. See Lodge 1327,
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Fraser & Johnston Co., 454 F.2d 88, 92 (9th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 920 (1972) (provision for arbitration of disputes over interpretation or application of collective bargaining agreement applies to question of whether the agreement continues to
apply at relocated plant); International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 403
F.2d 807, 810-11 (2d Cir. 1968) (applying Warrior presumption of arbitrability, the court held
question of whether precondition to arbitration, income drop in Medical Fund, was met, was a
question for arbitrators); A.S. Abell Co. v. Baltimore Typo. Union, 338 F.2d 190, 193 (4th Cir.
1964) (presumption of arbitrability under the Steelworkers Trilogy extended to issue of whether a
particular dispute is arbitrable under the terms of the agreement). See also Local 4, Elec.
Workers v. Radio Thirteen-Eighty, Inc., 469 F.2d 610, 614 (8th Cir. 1972) (labor policy requires
question of termination of collective bargaining agreement under its provisions be arbitrated
where agreement provides for arbitration of differences concerning its interpretation or application); Garlick Funeral Homes, Inc. v. Local 100, Service Employees Union, 87 L.R.R.M. 2254
(E.D.N.Y. 1974) (where application of a collective agreement to dispute arising prior to its
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presumed to be for judicial resolution. Far from being beyond the ken of an
arbitrator, in-course termination may be a question particularly within his
competence. 43 An approach reserving judicial jurisdiction by distinguishing
"legal" questions as non-arbitrable highlights judicial unwillingness to relinquish power more than it realizes policy objectives. Such an approach
disregards the Steelworkers admonition that a collective bargaining agreement
is more than a contract. Since Steelworkers, intent in a collective bargaining
44
agreement is gauged from a policy perspective.
Questions relating to extension past expiration are more properly for
judicial consideration. Unlike in-course termination, where an agreement has
expired on its face such expiration does not arise out of the working
relationship of the jaarties. A judicial determination of expiration, a less
ambiguous event, may be seen as more properly within the expectation of the
parties. But in-course termination should be presumed arbitrable under a
collective bargaining agreement with a broad arbitration clause. Arbitration
in this context would reduce duplication of effort, and avoid delay and
expense in resolving disputes. In addition, the presumption of arbitrability is
justified by the foreseeability of disputes over in-course termination. This
execution is unclear, arbitrator should decide the question of arbitrability); Local 24, Elec.
Workers v. William C. Bloom & Co., 242 F. Supp. 421, 429 (D. Md. 1965) (collective agreement
to arbitrate disputes "relating to this agreement" contemplated questions of arbitrability).
43. See Laundry Workers Local 93 v. Mahoney, 491 F.2d 1029, 1032 (8th Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 825 (1974) (presumption of arbitrability should apply to mid-term disputes
over wages and seniority); cf. Winston-Salem Printing Pressmen v. Piedmont Publishing Co., 393
F.2d 221, 224 (4th Cir.- 1968) (arbitration of new contracts); Davis v. Pro Basketball, Inc., 87
L.R.RM. 2285 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (occurrence of terminating event held arbitrable under provisions for arbitration of disputes over interpretation, application or compliance with the contract);
Aaron, Judicial Intervention in Labor Arbitration, 20 Stan. L. Rev. 41, 44 (1967); Note,
Procedural Arbitrability Under Section 301 of the LMRA, 73 Yale L.J. 1459, 1468 (1964). But cf.
La Vale Plaza, Inc. v. R.S. Noonan, Inc., 378 F.2d 569, 572 (3d Cir. 1967) ("the continuity of
judicial office and the tradition which surrounds judicial conduct is lacking in the isolated activity
of an arbitrator").
An opinion dissenting to the ordering of arbitration of a dispute involving the defense of laches
suggested that arbitrators not be given the power to decide questions related to arbitrability
because "it is not likely that [they] can be altogether objective in deciding whether or not they
ought to hear the merits. Once they have bitten into the enticing fruit of controversy, they are not
apt to stay the satisfying of their appetite after one bite." Trafalgar Shipping Co. v. International
Milling Co., 401 F.2d 568, 573-74 (2d Cir. 1968) (Lumbard, C.J., dissenting). This position was
later rejected by Flair.
44. "[W]e think special heed should be given to the context in which collective bargaining
agreements are negotiated and the purpose which they are intended to serve." United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960); see Affiliated Food Distrib., Inc. v. Local
229, 483 F.2d 418, 422 (3d Cir. 1973) (Adams, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 916 (1974)
("Rules of contract construction applicable in a normal commercial context are to be eschewed In
the interpretation of the arbitration clause of a collective bargaining agreement.'); Aaron, Judicial
Intervention in Labor Arbitration, 20 Stan. L. Rev. 41, 44-45 (1967); Gross, The Labor
Arbitrator's Role, 25 Arb. J. 221, 222 (1970); Jones, On Nudging and Shoving the National Steel
Arbitration into a Dubious Procedure, 79 Hare. L. Rev. 327 (1965); Note, Procedural Arbitrability Under Section 301 of the LMRA, 73 Yale L.J. 1459, 1461 (1964).
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foreseeability allows the parties expressly to rebut the arbitrability presumption where they so desire. In this manner, the parties' intentions can be easily
established 4s without extended judicial interpretation of the agreement. The
Supreme Court has to date extended a presumption of arbitrability to a
diverse group of disputes; Rainbow should not be allowed to narrow the
spectrum.
William L. Barish
Labor Law-Discriminatorily Discharged Employees Must Seek Work
Outside Their Trade to Mitigate Back Pay Damages.-Members of the
Louisville Typographical Union No. 10 went on strike against their employer,
the Madison Courier, to protest the employer's unfair labor practices.' The
strikers were discharged, but subsequently ordered reinstated by the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB).2 The NLRB also ordered back pay awards
for the discharged employees, and petitioned to enforce the awards in the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. An initial petition for
enforcement was denied and remanded by the court on the grounds that the
NLRB gave an inadequate explanation of its conclusions and "failed to consider
whether [the employees] made adequate efforts to locate comparable non-3
printing work commensurate with their respective employment histories."1
The NLRB issued a Second Supplemental Decision and Order4 and again
petitioned to enforce its back pay award, asserting, in support of its award,
that reasonable efforts had been made by the employees in seeking suitable
interim employment in the printing trade. The court of appeals modified the
NLRB's order, reasoning that "nonprinting employment was not per se
unsuitable" s and holding that, "when it became apparent that printing jobs
were not available in the Madison area, the claimants should have broadened
the scope of their search and sought suitable non-printing employment.1 6 The
mitigation efforts of nine of the ten claimants were held inadequate." NLRB
v. Madison Courier, Inc., 505 F.2d 391 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
The power of the NLRB to fashion remedies for unfair labor practices is
given by the National Labor Relations Act:8
45. The result in United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) was
defended on the grounds that contracting out, the basis of the action to compel arbitration, was
"grist in the mills of the arbitrators" which might easily be excluded from the grievance process
by a specific provision in the collective agreement. Id. at S84; see Laundry Workers Local 93 v.
Mahoney, 491 F.2d 1029, 1033 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 825 (1974).
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Madison Courier, Inc., 162 N.L.R.B. 550, 551 (1967).
Id. at 603.
NLRB v. Madison Courier, Inc., 472 F.2d 1307, 1323 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
' Madison Courier, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 808 (1973), modified, 505 F.2d 391 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
NLRB v. Madison Courier, Inc., 505 F.2d 391, 396 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
Id. at 402.
Id. at 405-06; see text accompanying notes 43-44 infra.
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970).
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[T]he Board ... shall issue and cause to be served on such person an order requiring
such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such
affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as
will effectuate the policies of this subchapter .... 9

Generally, the Supreme Court has interpreted this grant of remedial authority
broadly; however, the Court also has imposed specific limitations on the
Board's powers. Judicial review of NLRB orders is limited, but a court may
invalidate an order that is: (1) punitive rather than remedial (or otherwise
violative of the National Labor Relations Act's policies);' 0 (2) based on
findings of fact not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a
whole;1 1 or (3) concerned with questions of judgment and policy rather than
questions of fact alone.12
Traditionally, judicial review and enforcement of NLRB back pay awards
has incorporated the common law doctrine of mitigation of damages. The
common law rule is that a discharged employee will not recover damages that
could have been avoided by reasonable diligence in seeking and accepting
other employment; 13 but that "[h]is recovery will not be diminished because
9. Id. § 160(c).
10. "The declared policy of the Act ... is to prevent, by encouraging and protecting collective
bargaining and full freedom of association for workers, the costly dislocation and interruption of
the flow of commerce caused by unnecessary industrial strife and unrest." Virginia Elec. & Power
Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 539 (1943); accord, Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177,
193 (1941); see 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970). The Court has limited the Board's remedies under the Act
to the vindication of "public, not private, rights." Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, supm at
543. The Board's exercise of affirmative power must be " 'remedial, not punitive.' " Carpenters
Local 60 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651, 655 (1961) (quoting from Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB,
305 U.S. 197, 236 (1938)). But see Note, NLRB Power to Award Damages in Unfair Labor
Practice Cases, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1670, 1679-80 (1971). If the Board's action results In the
" 'dissipation' of the effects of the prohibited action" it is remedial. Carpenters Local 60 v.
NLRB, supra at 655 (quoting from NLRB v. District 50, UMW, 355 U.S. 453, 463 (1968)). A
back pay order is remedial since it removes the consequences of a violation of the Act, thus
vindicating the public policy of the Act. NLRB v. J.H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 396 U.S. 258, 263
(1969).
11. The Act mandates that the "findings of the Board with respect to questions of fact if
supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole shall be conclusive." 29
U.S.C. § 160(e) (1970). In Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951), the Court
defined substantial evidence as " 'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion."' Id. at 477 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305
U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). The Court also indicated that the reviewing courts must consider the whole
record including both the trial examiner's findings and any evidence opposed to the Board's
viewpoint. 340 U.S. at 487-88. This standard does not mean that "a court may displace the
Board's choice between two fairly conflicting views," but only that a court may invalidate the
Board's decision when the supporting evidence is insubstantial. Id. at 488; see text accompanying
note 52 infra.
12. "[W]here, as here, the review is not of a question of fact, but of a judgment as to the
proper balance to be struck between conflicting interests," review is proper. NLRB v. Brown,
380 U.S. 278, 292 (1965).
13. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, Contracts § 219 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Calamari &
Perillo]; 11 S. Williston, Contracts § 1359 (3d ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as Williston].
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he fails to engage in a business that is not of the same general character as
that for which he contracted, or fails to accept work at a distant place, though
it is of the same general character. 1 14 In one of the first cases dealing with the
mitigation doctrine in the NLRB context,15 the court analogized to the
situation of an employee wrongfully discharged in violation of his employment contract.
He cannot recover damages for losses which, in the exercise of due diligence, he could
have avoided; but he may refuse to accept other employment 'which is dangerous, or
distasteful and essentially different
from that for which he is employed, [or] ... at a
6
distance from his home."
Any question of reasonableness of the employee's efforts in mitigation-as
well as any question of comparability of particular jobs-is a question of fact
for the NLRB to determine.' 7 The role of the NLRB also was emphasized by
the Supreme Court in Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB. 18 The Board argued that
only actual interim earnings were properly deductible from a back pay award
and objected to an increased duty to evaluate mitigation efforts as too
complicated, time consuming and burdensome. The Court, however, decided
that "deductions should be made not only for actual earnings by the worker
but also for losses which he willfully incurred."' 9 The Court did emphasize
that the Board had wide discretion, freedom and power to avoid speculative
employer claims. Thus, the Board, in determining whether losses were
willfully incurred, should concentrate on "a clearly unjustifiable refusal to
' 20
take desirable new employment.
However, subsequent cases have altered the duty to mitigate damages,
notwithstanding the Supreme Court's admonition. Thus, a Fourth Circuit
case held that the failure of one discriminatorily discharged sawmill
employee, a former farmworker, to seek and accept available agricultural
work was unreasonable under the circumstances, and that the back pay
14.

11

Williston §

1359, at 307 (footnote omitted). A recent case states the common law rule:

"[A] discharged or demoted employee is not required... to accept alternative employment of an
'inferior kind', or of a more 'menial nature', or employment outside of his usual type or for which
he is not suffidently qualified by experience, or employment the inferiority of which might
injuriously affect the employee's future career or reputation in his profession." Williams v.
Albemarle City Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 1242, 1243 (4th Cir. 1974) (en banc).
15. Mooresville Cotton Mills v. NLRB, 110 F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1940).
16. Id. at 181 (quoting Restatement of Agency § 455, comment d at 1073 (1933)).
17. 110 F.2d at 181; see Florence Printing Co. v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 216, 221 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967) ("whether an employee acted reasonably.. . in accepting, rejecting,
or seeking ... employment, [is] a question of fact"); cf. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340
U.S. 474, 477 (1951).
18. 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
19. Id. at 198.

20. Id. at 199-200; see NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 349 (1953): "ln
devising a remedy the Board is not confined to the record of a particular proceeding. 'Cumulative
experience' begets understanding and insight by which judgments not objectively demonstrable
are validated or qualified or invalidated."
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amount he would have
award to that employee must be reduced by the
21
earned had he accepted the agricultural work.
In another enforcement proceeding relating to a back pay award, the
employer, a printer, alleged, inter alia, that the employees had incurred a
willful loss of earnings by refusing available work, albeit in trades unrelated
to printing. 22 The court nevertheless enforced the back pay awards, holding
that the burden of proof as to willful loss of earnings was on the employeronce the Board had established the amount of back pay due, the employer
must establish that the employees willfully refused available work-and that
he had failed to carry that burden. 23 Implicit in the decision is the possibility
that refusal to accept non-printing work might have jeopardized the
employee's back pay award, if the employer had satisfactorily established the
refusal. Whether an employee acted reasonably in seeking, accepting or
24
rejecting a particular job was held to be a question of fact for the Board.
Other courts seemed to imply25by their discussions that an employee need not
seek work outside his trade.
A further departure from the common law rule is found in cases adopting
26
the "lower sights" doctrine. Thus, in NLRB v. Southern Silk Mills, Inc.,
the court held that, after seven months of seeking employment in their trade,
the textile workers involved in the case should have sought other lower
paying jobs. This "lower sights" doctrine apparently has not been accepted by
all the circuits. 27 It should be noted, however, that in many enforcement
21. NLRB v. Moss Planing Mill Co., 224 F.2d 702 (4th Cir. 1955).
22.
Florence Printing Co. v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 216 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840
(1967).
23. Id. at 221-23; see NLRB v. Ohio Hoist Mfg. Co., 496 F.2d 14 (6th Cir. 1974) (per
curiam); NLRB v. Nickey Chevrolet Sales, Inc., 493 F.2d 103 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
834 (1974); Heinrich Motors, Inc. v. NLRB, 403 F.2d 145, 148 (2d Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Mastro
Plastics Corp., 354 F.2d 170, 175 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 972 (1966); Nabors v.
NLRB, 323 F.2d 686, 692 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 911 (1964); NLRB v. Brown &
Root, Inc., 311 F.2d 447, 454 (8th Cir. 1963); cf. White v. Bloomberg, 501 F.2d 1379, 1382 (4th
Cir. 1974).
24. 376 F.2d at 221; see note 17 supra and accompanying text.
25. See, e.g., NLRB v. Ohio Hoist Mfg. Co., 496 F.2d 14 (6th Cir. 1974) (per curiam);
NLRB v. Nickey Chevrolet Sales, Inc., 493 F.2d 103, 107 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 834
(1974); Golay & Co. v. NLRB, 447 F.2d 290, 295 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1058
(1972); Lozano Enterprises, 152 N.L.R.B. 258, 260 (1965), enforced, 356 F.2d 483 (9th Cir.
1966). See also Laidlaw Corp. v. NLRB, 507 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 43
U.S.L.W. 3585 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1975) (No. 74-1317).
26. 242 F.2d 697, 700 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 821 (1957). This case adopted a
"lower sights" doctrine which mandates that, at a certain point, an employee must seek and
accept a lower paying job to mitigate adequately his damages. Id.
27.
See, e.g., Golay & Co. v. NLRB, 447 F.2d 290 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1058 (1972). In Lozano Enterprises, 152 N.L.R.B. 258, 260 (1965), the NLRB found that a
wrongfully discharged linotype operator adequately mitigated damages despite the fact that he
quit an interim job as a janitor. The Board found such an action justified because a janitorial job
was unsuited to a person of such skill and experience and "did not meet the 'desirable new
employment' standard . . . ." Id. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the order holding that the findings
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proceedings, the question of suitability or28comparability of particular jobs was
tangential to the court's determination.
NLRB v. Madison Courier,Inc. 29 appears to represent the broadest expansion to date of the duty to mitigate damages. There, the court held that even a
skilled employee, a printer, must, after a certain period of searching for
employment within his trade, seek employment outside that trade. 30 The
court in Madison Courier viewed the mitigation question as one involving
alternatives--either the employee remained idle or he obtained a comparable
job in another field. It stated that such a question should be resolved pursuant
to the policy of the Act-the promotion of production and employment. 3 1 The
court cited other decisions to support its requirement that employees seek
work outside their field, but those cases appear to be distinguishable. 32 It
viewed other cases as involving a mere failure of proof on the part of the
employer. Since a common law action vindicates a private right only, whereas
the Act seeks to promote the public policies of production and employment, 33
the common law doctrine of mitigation was found not directly applicable. The
court held that the mitigation doctrine must further the employment and
34
production policies of the National Labor Relations Act.
While the court suggested that the claimants were entitled to search within
their trade for a reasonable time after the duty to mitigate arose, it held that
when it became clear that printing jobs were not available in the Madison
area, the claimants should have sought suitable non-printing employment. 3s
of the trial examiner and the Board were amply supported by the evidence, NLRB v. Lozano
Enterprises, 356 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1966).
28. See cases cited in note 25 supra. It should be noted that self-employment or acceptance of
different employment does mitigate damages. See, e.g., Golay & Co. v. NLRB, 447 F.2d 290,
295 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1058 (1972); Heinrich Motors, Inc. v. NLRB, 403 F.2d
145, 148 (2d Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Armstrong Tire & Rubber Co., 263 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1959).
29. 505 F.2d 391 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
30. Id. at 402.
31. Id. at 397; see note 10 supra.
32. The court relied upon NLRB v. Moss Planing Mill Co., 224 F.2d 702, 704-06 (4th Cir.
1955). That case can be read only as holding than an unskilled employee may be required to seek
other unskilled work in order to mitigate damages. NLRB v. Southern Silk Mills, Inc., 242 F.2d
697 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 821 (1957) announced the "lower sights" doctrine. See note
26 supra.
33. See notes 10 and 14 supra.
34. 505 F.2d at 398; see note 10 supra. But see Zim's Foodliner, Inc. v. NLRB, 495 F.2d
1131, 1144 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 838 (1974) (the goal of back pay is " 'restoration of the
situation... to that which would have obtained but for the illegal discrimination' "). Id. at 1144
(quoting F.W. Woolworth Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 289, 292 (1950), in turn quoting Phelps Dodge
Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941)).
35. 505 F.2d at 402. The court indicated that after October 1966, the right to back pay
terminated for those who should have sought outside employment. This was four months after
the application for reinstatement of the strikers was received by the employer in July 1966 and
more than one year after the strike had begun in April 1965. Reinstatement of the strikers was
offered by the employer in January 1968. Id. at 394-95. Therefore, for the period of 14 months
the claimants should have sought employment in other fields. Id. at 394-95.
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At the same time, the court would require the claimants to accept only
"non-printing work which is no more dangerous or distasteful or essentially
different from [their] regular job[s]
and which is suitable to [their]
''36
background[s] and experience[s].
Having set forth the standards, the court undertook to match each printer's
background 37 with the available non-printing work in the area, stating that
"this court does have the authority to make the necessary determinations
where the Board has been given the opportunity to correct its order but
refused to do so. ' ' a s The court found that seven of the ten claimants should
have sought and accepted suitable non-printing employment. Non-printing
jobs were not suitable for three of the printers because of their "ages and long
experience in the printing trade. ' 39 The court further analyzed each individual printer's efforts in seeking work within the printing trade. All the
strikers had registered with the state employment agency, 40 which is a factor,
albeit no longer a conclusive one, in assessing the efforts exerted, 4 1 and all the
strikers relied on the union "grapevine." However, the court found particularly significant the fact that "most of the claimants made no individual
applications for employment in the printing trade. '42 The court found that six
of the ten claimants were not entitled to any award. 43 With regard to two
employees who had accepted lower-paying, part-time, non-printing jobs, the
court recognized the dilemma in concluding that such an acceptance was an
inadequate effort:
If he accepts the lower-paying job too soon, he may be held to have incurred a willful
loss of income by accepting an unsuitable position. But if he turns down the
lower-paying job, he may be held to have incurred a willful loss of earnings by failing
to "lower his sights." Consequently, doubts in this area should be resolved in favor of
44
the claimant.
36. Id. at 398.
37. Cf. id. In examining each individual employee's efforts to mitigate damages, the court
followed the traditional approach. See, e.g., NLRB v. Rice Lake Creamery Co., 365 F.2d 888
(D.C. Cir. 1966).
38. 505 F.2d at 399. Such authority is questioned in the dissent. See notes 47 and 51 infra and
accompanying text. This assertion might also be questioned in light of NLRB v. Food Store
Employees Local 347, 417 U.S. 1, 10 n.10 (1974), in which the Supreme Court at least impliedly
left open this question. See also NLRB v. Armstrong Tire & Rubber Co., 263 F.2d 680, 682 (5th
Cir. 1959) ("the Act vests in the Board itself the sole authority to determine the amount of back
pay due an employee who has been discriminated against . . .
.
39. 505 F.2d at 402. These three claimants were about 60 years old when the strike began
and two of them had worked for the company for approximately 40 years. Id. at 401. The court
offered no explanation for the special treatment afforded these senior workers.
40. See NLRB v. Pugh & Barr, Inc., 207 F.2d 409 (4th Cir. 1953) (per curiam).
41. Id.; cf. J.H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 473 F.2d 223, 242 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 822 (1973).
42. 505 F.2d at 404. This fact may have been over-emphasized by the court since In a
specialized field such as printing, contacts with the union as well as with other printers In the
area might have been a very reliable method of remaining informed about possible printing
opportunities.
43. See id. at 405-06.
44. Id. at 405.
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These two claimants should have, after a reasonable time, realized that no
printing work was available and, at this point, should have sought full-time
employment outside their trade. Therefore, they failed adequately to mitigate
damages after that time and consequently received back pay awards for the
first period only.
The court's reliance upon an individual employee's past experience as a
measure of "suitability" presents a problem if the employee's past work
experiences were "distasteful," since the court indicated that an employee
would not be required to seek or accept "distasteful" work. Because the
decision accepts a "lower sights" doctrine4 s and a duty to seek employment in
other fields, an employee would be forced to seek work of almost any type at
any pay, particularly if he had no past work experience or all his past
employments were "distasteful." Furthermore, the employee is faced with the
dilemma, noticed by the court, of not knowing at what point acceptance of
lower paying work will be considered necessary to mitigate adequately in
46
order to avoid a willful loss of earnings.
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Leventhal maintained that "the court's
opinion represents an unwarranted intrusion on the agency's functioning ' 7 in
that the Board was given the statutory authority to effectuate the Act's
objectives. He stated that the Board's supplemental decision reflected an
analysis of the claimants' individual efforts in accordance with the previous
court opinion. 48 The Board's holding "that the Company had not carried the
burden of proving a willful loss of earnings ... was a reasonable determination, within the Board's discretion and expertise." 49 The dissent referred to
the Board's findings that there was no showing made of available jobs within
the printing trade and that the showing of opportunities outside the printing
trade was irrelevant because those opportunities were not suitable "considering the skill, background and experience of each of the claimants." 5 The
dissent concluded that, even if the Board's findings failed to support its order,
"this court does not have the authority to make a determination for itself that
the employees have rejected suitable employment."sI Interestingly, the dissent
failed to cite a single authority for its views.
Arguably, the court failed to give proper deference to the substantial
evidence standard of review. In recognition of its expertise, the Board has
been empowered to resolve factual questions conclusively if supported by
substantial evidence. s 2 The issue of mitigation is normally viewed as factual
45.
46.
47.
48.

See
See
505
See

49.

505 F.2d at 406 (Leventhal, J., dissenting). "The Board could consider it a fact of life that

note 26 supra and accompanying text.
note 20 supra and accompanying text.
F.2d at 406 (Leventhal, J., dissenting).
NLRB v. Madison Courier, Inc., 472 F.2d 1307 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

infuses meaning into a cold record that the printing employers from Versailles and North Vernon
who visited Madison did not want men who were on the picket line." Id.
5O. Id.
51.

Id. at 407.

52. See note 11 supra and accompanying text. See also NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 292
(1965); Nabors v. NLRB, 323 F.2d 686, 690 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 911 (1964);
NLRB v. Bishop, 228 F.2d 68, 70 (6th Cir. 1955).
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53

in nature. Calling such a question a policy issue should not permit a court to
broaden the normal standard of review. When courts have found factual
findings of the Board unsupported by the record, they have remanded the
case for further consideration, or denied enforcement of the order. 54 Since this
procedure had already been followed in Madison Courier, the court, under
the policy guise, rendered specific factual findings. While a logical argument
could be made to support such an approach, particularly since the court felt
that the Board had ignored its prior instructions, nevertheless, there appears
to be no authority for this decision, and indeed the court referred to none.
There are arguments in favor of the decision in Madison Courier. An
economic rationale can be advanced to support the new approach to the
mitigation issue.5s Perhaps the strongest rationale for modifying the common
law mitigation doctrine in unfair labor practice cases so as to require the
employee to seek employment outside his field is based on the very different
circumstances presented in an unfair labor practice case as contrasted to a
common law action to recover for breach of employment contract. Since
reinstatement with back pay is a remedy frequently imposed in section 8(a)(3)
discriminatory discharge cases, once an unfair labor practice is found by the
trial examiner or the NLRB, the discharged employee might reasonably expect
that remedy. Therefore, any job sought or accepted would be clearly temporary until reinstatement. In an action for an employer's breach of contract of
employment and wrongful discharge, on the other hand, an employee can
have no reason to believe that he will receive back pay until the wrongfulness
of the discharge is decided by the court; he also can have no reason to believe,
at any time, that he will be reinstated, since reinstatement is an extraordinary
remedy at common law. 5 6 Thus, any employment sought to mitigate damages
in the common law situation would more likely be permanent, and it would
be more reasonable for the discharged employee to decline to accept such
employment if he found it unsatisfactory. These differences in the certainty
and character of the remedies applied distinguish the two situations and could
justify separate mitigation doctrines.
However, there are disadvantages to expanding the duty to mitigate in this
53. See notes 17 and 24 supra and accompanying text:
54. "A reviewing court may 'enforce the Board order, deny enforcement, enforce in part,
remand for the taking of further evidence or for making additional findings of fact or conclusions." 1 B. Weme, Labor Relations: Law & Practice § 18.3, at 165 (1966).
55. In evaluating the court's decision, the economic situation of the country must be
considered. At a time when jobs are scarce, an individual's chance of success in finding a suitable
job within his field declines. Thus, an expansion of the common law mitigation rule to encompass
work outside the field would result in a greater probability of finding a job and would tend to
alleviate hardship during a period of job shortage by promoting mobility of the labor force.
56. "The general rule is that an employee may not have specific performance against an
employer when the employment contract is breached by wrongful discharge." D. Dobbs,
Remedies § 12.25, at 929 (1973). But cf. In re Staklinski v. Pyramid Elec. Co., 6 N.Y.2d 159,
160 N.E.2d 78, 188 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1959) where the court affirmed an arbitrator's award of
reinstatement, despite the common law rule against the specific performance remedy. "Whether a
court of equity could issue a specific performance decree in a case like this . . . is beside the
point." Id. at 163-64, 160 N.E.2d at 80, 188 N.Y.S.2d at 543 (citation omitted).
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context. Employers may conclude that they can engage in unfair labor
practices with impunity or at least be subject to smaller back pay damages;
thus, whatever deterrent effect the payment of a potential back pay award
has upon an employer would be eliminated or reduced. s 7 Moreover, this
expansive rule could have adverse effects on the strength of the union, thus
hindering the collective bargaining ideal of the Act.55 The District of Columbia Circuit failed to consider these ramifications of its decision.
The Madison Courier decision also affects the burden of proof of the
employer and the Board's burden of showing substantial evidence supporting
its conclusions. Since the burden of showing the failure to mitigate is on the
employer, 5 9 he would be required only to show that some suitable jobs existed
during the back pay period in that locality in order to meet his burden. On
the other hand, the Board would be required to perform a detailed analysis of
each claimant's experiences and tastes in order to meet its burden of substantial evidence supporting its conclusions.60 This increased burden may increase
61
the already substantial delay in the settlement of such labor disputes.
The courts rationale in support of its mitigation rule also may be questioned. The purpose of mitigation is to prevent recovery for consequences or
losses that could have been avoided; 62 the purpose of back pay awards is to
promote the Act's policy by removing the effects of violations and restoring
wrongfully discharged employees to their economic status quo. 6 3 It has been
argued that the back pay remedy is inadequate. 64 To reason that not only the
back pay award, but the mitigation doctrine itself, should further the Act's
57. There are some employers who believe that" '[ilt's cheaper to fire employees mixed up in
union affairs, even if you have to pay their backpay. I would do it again if the problem came
up.'" O'Hara & Pollitt, Section 8(a)(3) of the Labor Act: Problems and Legislative Proposals, 14
Wayne L. Rev. 1104, 1113 (1968) [hereinafter cited as O'Hara & Polliu], quoting L. Aspin, A
Study of Reinstatement Under the National Labor Relations Act 72, Feb. 15, 1966 (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation in the MIT library).
The NLRB has sought to improve the deterrent effect of the back pay award by adopting a
formula for computing back pay on a quarterly basis. F.W. Woolworth Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 289,
292-93 (1950). The problem arose in the context of the employee who, while mitigating damages,
obtained a higher paying job. "Some employers... have deliberately refrained from offering
reinstatement, knowing that the greater the delay, the greater would be the reduction in back-pay
liability. Thus, a recalcitrant employer may continue to profit by excluding union adherents from
his enterprise." Id. at 292. Under the Woolworth formula, an employee's back pay award is
computed on a quarterly basis: once the amount is determined for a particular quarter, a job
subsequently obtained cannot reduce the award for that quarter. Id. at 293. The formula was
approved in NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344 (1953).
58. See note 10 supra.
59. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
60. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
61. See O'Hara & Pollitt 1118-25; 19 U. Kan. L. Rev. 325 (1971).
62. See Calamari & Perillo § 219; 11 Williston § 1359.
63. See note 10 supra. See also Zim's Foodliner, Inc. v. NLRB, 495 F.2d 1131 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 838 (1974).
64. "The 'back-pay' remedy is also inadequate. A lump sum payment of back pay does not
compensate for the loss of a steady income. Installment payments and rent cannot be put off until
a NLRB case is settled." O'Hara & Pollitt 1114-15; see Note, supra note 10, at 1674.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

objectives is to distort the theory and purpose of mitigation while ignoring the
raison d'Rtre of back pay awards. Such an approach overemphasizes the
mitigation doctrine, a limitation on the remedy, to the detriment of the back
pay remedy as a whole.
In the final analysis, the court's decision goes far toward eviscerating the
effectiveness of the back pay remedy. By disregarding the overall purpose of
this remedy and the expertise of the Board, by making the employer's burden
so light as to be inconsequential, and by assuming the authority to make
findings of fact, the court "mitigated" the protection afforded to employees
under the Act.
Gail Davis Reiner

Taxation-Exercise of Only "Significant" Control over Debtor's Operations Subjects Lender to 100 Percent Withholding Tax Penalty.Taxpayer, the Skobis Company, failed to remit to the government federal
income and employment taxes that it had withheld from the wages of its
employees during the second and third quarters of 1970. Pursuant to section
6672 of the Internal Revenue Code,' the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
assessed a penalty equal to 100 percent of the delinquent amount against the
taxpayer's president and the Lakeshore Commercial Finance Corporation
(lender) which had lent operating capital to the taxpayer. Taxpayer's president personally paid a portion of the penalty and sued in federal district court
for a refund and for an abatement of the penalty. 2 The government counterclaimed against the taxpayer's president and filed a third party complaint
against the lender, alleging that it was jointly liable for the section 6672
penalty " 'as a person who willfully failed to pay over federal income and
employment taxes withheld from the wages of employees of the [taxpayer]
... ,"3 The affidavits submitted in connection with the lender's motion for
summary judgment set forth a revolving loan agreement under which the
lender advanced funds to the taxpayer, secured by the latter's accounts
receivable and inventory. 4 Such advances, with several exceptions, were
deposited in taxpayer's bank account and were not subject to further control
by the lender. The district court found that the lender did not come within the
definition of a "person" liable for the penalty within the meaning of section
1. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6672.
2. The president's claim against the IRS for a refund was disallowed. Adams v. United
States, 353 F. Supp. 333 (E.D. Wis. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 504 F.2d 73 (7th Cir. 1974).
3. Adams v. United States, 504 F.2d 73, 74 (7th Cir. 1974) (quoting government's third party
complaint).
4. "The 'earnings and income' received by [the lender] constitute the accounts receivable
paid to [the debtor-taxpayer] and the proceeds from the sale of inventory, or in other words, the
liquidated collateral which had secured previous advances. The partial reimbursement of
earnings and income by [lender] to [taxpayer] was the advancement of further funds secured by
inventory and uncollected accounts receivable." Id. at 79 (Campbell, J.,dissenting).
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6672 and granted its motion for summary judgment.- The Court of Appeals

for the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that there were
substantial issues of fact as to whether the lender had exercised such control
over the taxpayer's use of the loan proceeds and disbursement of the taxpayer's earnings as to render it a "person" liable for the penalty. Adams v. United
States, 504 F.2d 73 (7th Cir. 1974).

Section 6672 provides that any person who willfully fails to collect, account
for and pay over to the government any tax imposed by the Internal Revenue6
Code will be liable for a penalty equal to 100 percent of the delinquent taxes.
The section applies to two particular levies that an employer is required to
withhold from wages paid to its employees: 7 the federal (income) withholding
tax8 and the employment ("FICA") tax. 9 These withheld amounts become the
corpus of a statutory trust' 0 until paid over to the government at specified
intervals." A penalty will2 be assessed against the person liable if these
amounts are not remitted.'
5. Adams v. United States, 353 F. Supp. 333, 335 (E.D. Wis. 1973), rev'd, 504 F.2d 73 (7th
Cir. 1974).
6. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6672. Section 6672 is a civil penalty. The Code also provides for
criminal penalties with respect to the duties imposed under section 6672. See, e.g., id. §§ 7202,
7215 (felony and misdemeanor provisions respectively). The constitutionality of a predecessor
statute similar in form to § 6672 was upheld in Bloom v. United States, 272 F.2d 215 (9th Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 803 (1960) (construing Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 26, § 2707, 53
Stat. 290).

7. Under the Int. Rev. Code of 1954, an employer, as defined in § 3401(d), is required to
withhold specified amounts, id. §§ 3402(a)-(c), from the wages paid to employees representing the
income taxes on such wages. See id. § 3401. Similarly, an employer must withhold certain
amounts from an employee's wages representing contributions under the Federal Insurance
Contributions Act, id. §§ 3101-26. Section 6672 does not apply to an employer's direct contribution of FICA taxes, but only to FICA taxes contributed by employees under the withholding
plan. In re Serignese, 214 F. Supp. 917, 921 (D. Conn. 1963), aff'd per curian sub nom. Goring
v. United States, 330 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1964).
8. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 3402, 3403.
9. Id. §§ 3101, 3102(b).
10. Id. § 7501(a) provides that any person required to "collect or withhold" any tax is a
trustee of "a special fund in trust for the United States." The primary purpose of the statutory
trust is to protect the tax revenue withheld by the employer. See Dorsey v. United States, 18 Am.
Fed. Tax R.2d 5596 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
11. Generally, employers must file returns of the amounts withheld from wages on a quarterly
basis. Treas. Reg. §§ 31.6011(a)-i, -4(a) (1959).
12. Ordinarily, a taxpayer may not file suit to enjoin the collection of the penalty imposed
under § 6672. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7421; Shaw v. United States, 331 F.2d 493 (9th Cir.
1964); Botta v. Scanlon, 314 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1963); Iraci v. Scanlon, 219 F. Supp. 796
(E.D.N.Y. 1963). If, however, the person against whom the penalty is assessed can show that
collection of the penalty would result in irreparable injury, a district court may enjoin the
collection. Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co., 284 U.S. 498 (1932); cf. Enochs v. Williams
Packing & Nav. Co., 370 U.S. 1 (1962). Amounts paid under the § 6672 penalty may not be
deducted as business expenses. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 162(f); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a) (1969).
The administrative procedures for protesting a proposed penalty assessment are found in Rev.
Proc. 57-26, 1957-2 Cum. Bull. 1093, as amplified by Rev. Proc. 61-27, 1961-2 Cum. Bull. 563.
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There are two statutory elements to the imposition of liability: the individual sought to be held responsible must be a "person" within the scope of
the provision 13 and that "person" must "willfully" fail to perform his collection and remittance duties. 14 The term "person" is defined in two provisions
of the Code. Section 6671(b), setting forth the "rules for application of
assessable penalties," states that "[t]he term 'person' . . includes an officer or
employee of a corporation, or a member or employee of a partnership . . .,,"
A broader definition of "person" is contained in section 7701(a)(1), the general
definitions section, which states: "When used in this title, where not otherwise
distinctly expressed or manifestly incompatible with the intent thereof . . .
[t]he term 'person' shall ... include an individual, a trust, estate, partnership,
association, company or corporation.' 1 6 Since the assessable penalties subchapter contains a "distinctly expressed" definition of "person" which is
clearly narrower than the definition in the general definitions provision, the
former should control determinations of what types of persons are liable for
the 100 percent penalty.
When a corporation fails to remit withheld taxes, the IRS typically looks to
17
the officers or directors of the corporation to determine whether they
.

In order to litigate a penalty assessment in district court, a taxpayer must pay at least part of the
penalty and bring suit for a refund. Psaty v. United States, 442 F.2d 1154, 1159 (3d Cir. 1971);
Steele v. United States, 280 F.2d 89, 90-91 (8th Cir. 1960); see 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (1970).
13. "[A]pplication of this penalty is limited only to the collected or withheld taxes which are
imposed on some person other than the person who is required to collect, account for and pay
over the tax." H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 542 (1954); see Treas. Reg. § 301.6672-1
(1957).
14. This Case Note is concerned only with the scope of the definition of "person" under
§ 6672. The definition of "willfully" is a distinct issue. The element of willfulness in § 6672 cases
does not require evil motives, Horwitz v. United States, 236 F. Supp. 812, 814 (S.D.N.Y. 1964),
aff'd, 339 F.2d 877 (2d Cir. 1965) (predecessor statute), or an intent to defraud the government,
Flan v. United States, 326 F.2d 356, 358 (7th Cir. 1964); Bloom v. United States, 272 F.2d 215,
223 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 803 (1960), but only a "voluntary, conscious and
intentional act" such as paying other creditors before the government when there are sufficient
funds to pay the taxes due. Mulcahy v. United States, CCH 1969 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep., U.S.
Tax Cas. (69-2) 9553 (S.D. Tex. 1969); Jacquin v. United States, CCH 1968 Stand. Fed. Tax
Rep., U.S. Tax Cas. (68-1) 9300 (N.D.N.Y. 1968); Tiffany v. United States, 228 F. Supp. 700,
702 (D.N.J. 1963); United States v. Slattery, 224 F. Supp. 214, 217-18 (E.D. Pa. 1963), aff'd per
curiam, 333 F.2d 844 (3d Cir. 1964). Upon assessment of the penalty by the IRS, the person
assessed bears the burden of proving either that he did not willfully fail to pay over such taxes or
that he was not a "person" responsible for paying them over. Liddon v. United States, 448 F.2d
509 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 918 (1972); Lesser v. United States, 368 F.2d 306 (2d
Cir. 1966); Lawrence v. United States, 299 F. Supp. 187 (N.D. Tex. 1969); Melillo v. United
States, 244 F. Supp. 323, 326 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
15. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6671(b) (emphasis added).
16. Id. § 7701(aX1).
17. The 100 percent penalty may be assessed against more than one "responsible person."
United States v. Graham, 309 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962); Datlof v. United States, 252 F. Supp. II
(E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 370 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 906 (1967); White v. United
States, 372 F.2d 513 (Ct. Cl. 1967). Payment by one "person," however, extinguishes the
employer's liability for the taxes and other "persons' " liability for the assessed penalty. Datlof v.
United States, supra; see Kelly v. Lethert, 362 F.2d 629, 635 (8th Cir. 1966).
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can be held responsible. 1 8 The judicial standard applied is whether, at
the time of the violation, the individual had "'the authority to direct or
control the payment of corporate funds ..

.

"19 or had the final word as to

which creditors or what bills were to be or not to be paid. 20 These formula21
tions are within the narrower, section 6671(b) definition of "person.1
In recent years, however, the IRS has sought to impose the 100 percent
penalty upon lenders even though, on its face, the section 6671(b) definition
does not include persons outside the taxpayer's corporate structure.22 Courts
generally have sustained this extension, justifying their decisions to reach
beyond the corporate hierarchy of the debtor by construing section 6672 as a
"device of a civil nature designed for the collection of taxes legitimately due
and unpaid.12 3 Thus, it has been said that the word "includes" in section
18. Various individuals in discretionary positions in the corporate structure of the taxpayer
held to be "persons" liable for the penalty include (1) corporate presidents (e.g., Moore v. United
States, 465 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1973); Miller v. United States,
CCH 1974 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep., U.S. Tax Cas. (74-1) 9343 (M.D. Fla. 1974)), (2) corporate
directors (Liddon v. United States, 448 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 918
(1972); United States v. Graham, 309 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962); Braden v. United States, 318 F.
Supp. 1189 (S.D. Ohio 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 342 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 912 (1971)),
(3) chief executive officers (Wilson v. United States, 250 F.2d 312 (9th Cir. 1957) (predecessor
statute)), and (4) treasurers (Sinclair v. United States, 453 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam)).
See generally Crampton, The 100 Percent Penalty On a "Responsible Officer," N.Y.U. 21st Inst.
on Fed. Tax. 117 (1963); Yudkin, Corporate Officers in Increasing Numbers Face Penalties for
Defaults on Withholding Tax, 18 J. Tax. 248 (1963); Zampino, The Right of Subrogation in
Bankruptcy to the Claims of Taxing Authorities where Officers of a Corporation Personally Pay
the Taxes, 1 N.Y.U. 30th Inst. on Fed. Tax. 299, 303-08 (1972).
19. Werner v. United States, 374 F. Supp. 558, 560 (D. Conn. 1974) (quoting Stake v. United
States, 347 F. Supp. 823, 826 (D. Minn. 1972)). Corporate officers and employees are not
considered responsible "persons" unless they actually exercise control over corporate disbursements. Isaac v. United States, CCH 1970 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep., U.S. Tax Cas. (70-2)
9541
(C.D. Cal. 1970); Grossberg v. United States, CCH 1968 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep., U.S. Tax Cas.
(68-2)
9506 (E.D. Va. 1968).
20. Bloom v. United States, 272 F.2d 215, 222 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 803
(1960); accord, Turner v. United States, 423 F.2d 448 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Graham,
309 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962); Burack v. United States, 461 F.2d 1282 (Ct. Cl. 1972); see
Silberberg v. United States, 355 F. Supp. 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Melillo v. United States, 244 F.
Supp. 323 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
21. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
22. Pacific Natl Ins. Co. v. United States, 422 F.2d 26, 31 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
937 (1970) ("[Section 6672] was designed to cut through the shield of organizational form and
impose liability upon those actually responsible for an employer's failure to withhold and pay
over the tax.').
23. Pacific Nat'l Ins. Co. v. United States, 270 F. Supp. 165, 171 (N.D. Cal. 1967), aff'd, 422
F.2d 26 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970); accord, Bloom v. United States, 272 F.2d
215, 223 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 803 (1960) (predecessor statute); see Datlof v.
United States, 252 F. Supp. 11 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 370 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387
U.S. 906 (1967); Dorsey v. United States, CCH 1966 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep., U.S. Tax Cas. (66-2)
9521 (E.D.N.Y. 1966); White v. United States, 372 F.2d 513 (Ct. Cl. 1967); note 32 infra and
accompanying text.
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6671(b) was intended to suggest a "calculated indefiniteness" 24 and that the
enumeration of individuals in section 6671(b) was intended to be illustrative
rather than exclusive. 25 In this manner, courts have extended the section
6671(b) definition of "person" to encompass the broader section 7701(a)(1)
definition. 26 Thus, lending institutions that, in connection with a loan,
exercise managerial functions ordinarily reserved to the taxpayer-borrower's
officers and directors have been held to be persons within the meaning of the
27
section.

In determining whether a lender is a "person" liable under section 6672,
courts have applied a standard similar to the one applied to the lender's
officers and directors: the lender must be a person who exercises such control
as to be the ultimate authority as to the payment of the taxes. 2 8 Whether a
lender possesses sufficient control is a question of fact to be resolved according
to the particular circumstances of each case. The few cases that have
discussed the legal standard of control requisite for imposition of section 6672
liability upon a lender, however, demonstrate a trend toward a lessening of
the degree of control a lender actually must assert over the debtor-taxpayer.
In one case considering lender liability under section 6672, United States v.
Hill,29 the taxpayer had assigned contracts to the lender as collateral for a
revolving loan agreement. 30 The bank approved all taxpayer's checks over
$500 and required the taxpayer to advise it of all large disbursements. 3 1 The
Fifth Circuit found section 6672 to be penal in nature and, therefore,
construed it narrowly. 32 In refusing to impose liability upon the lender in the
absence of a finding that it had exercised "full authority" over the debtor's
24. "[The] system cannot function unless the law ...
were to focus upon some one person,
broadly defined, and, when necessary, judicially determined ad hoc, as responsible for withholding and remittance .... ." Regan & Co. v. United States, 290 F. Supp. 470, 479 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
25. Pacific Nat'l Ins. Co. v. United States, 422 F.2d 26, 30-31 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 937 (1970). The Code provides that the word " 'includes' . . . when used in a definition
contained in [the Code] shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the meaning
of the term defined." Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7701(b).
26. Pacific Nat'l Ins. Co. v. United States, 422 F.2d 26, 30 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
937 (1970); see text accompanying notes 15-16 supra.
27. Pacific Nat'l Ins. Co. v. United States, 422 F.2d 26, 30 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
937 (1970).
28. Mueller v. Nixon, 470 F.2d 1348 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 949 (1973);
Turner v. United States, 423 F.2d 448, 449 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Hill, 368 F.2d 617,
621 (5th Cir. 1966); Krueger v. United States, 326 F. Supp. 231, 233 (E.D. Wis. 1971); Dunham
v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 700, 702 (D. Conn. 1969).
29. 368 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1966).
30. Id. at 619.
31. Id. at 620.
32. "That the Bank exercised a veto power over corporate checks. . . to insure their use to
keep the company alive nowhere brings the Bank within the penal provisions of the statute." Id.
at 623; see United States v. Mr. Hamburg Bronx Corp., 228 F. Supp. 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1964);
Cushman v. Wood, 149 F. Supp. 644 (D. Ariz. 1956); Smith v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 1100,
aff'd, 294 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1961). The view of § 6672 as a penal measure is not supported by
the cases. In Bolme v. Nixon, 239 F. Supp. 907, 910 (E.D. Mich. 1965), the court stated: "100%
penalty assessments are civil in nature and constitute taxes as distinguished from penalties.
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financial affairs, 33 the court emphasized that the bank did not manage the
taxpayer's internal operations and that the taxpayer was free to draw on its
own account to the extent of its funds. 34 The decision broadly implied,
therefore, that section 6672 liability attaches only to lenders possessing all the
attributes of an "employer in fact" of the taxpayer's employees
from whose
35
wages the subject taxes were to be withheld and remitted.
The "employer in fact" standard was adopted by a federal district court in
Girard Trust Corn Exchange Bank v. United States,36 where the facts
demonstrated almost total lender control over the affairs of the debtortaxpayer. A loan agreement allowed the lender to "supervise the operation of
the [taxpayer's] business, ' 37 and the taxpayer could pay its long-term debts,
taxes and daily operating expenses (including salaries) only to the extent that
the lender approved. 38 In addition, the lender countersigned all the taxpayer's
checks. 39 The district court instructed the jury:
"[f...
you conclude ... that in effect the [lender] was operating this business, (that]
they were the employer, [that] they controlled the payment of taxes, bills [and] the
accounts, . . . you should conclude that they were responsible [for the penalty] .... ."I

The jury found the lender not to be liable under this charge and the court
denied judgment n.o.v. 41 since there was no evidence that the lender had
participated in such internal operations of the taxpayer as
merchandizing and
42
personnel decisions or the preparation of tax returns.

The "employer in fact" standard was modified substantially in Pacific
National Insurance Co. v. United States, 43 where the lender's control over the
McAllister v. Dudley, 148 F. Supp. 548 (W.D.Pa. 1956); Headley v. Knox, 133 F. Supp. 36 (D.
Minn. 1955)." This appears to be the prevailing view. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
33. 368 F.2d at 621.
34. Id. at 622.
35. The court acknowledged that other courts had indicated a preference toward imposing
liability on persons within the corporate structure of the taxpayer-employer. Id. In addition, the
court noted that the legislative history of Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 7512 & 7515, which added
criminal penalties, suggested that a person other than the direct employer can not be required to
pay withholding taxes. See S. Rep. No. 1182, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1958).
36. 259 F. Supp. 214 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
37. Id. at 215.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 216.
40. Id. at 217 (emphasis added) (quoting the court's charge to the jury). The specific factors
that the court instructed the jury to consider evidence the extent of control necessary to meet the
employer in fact standard: " 'Who was in control of this business operation, generally speaking?
Specifically speaking, who had control of the hiring and discharging of the employees? Who had
the control of the receipt. . . and the deposit of funds? Who had control of paying the bills? Who
had control of approving credit given to customers of the establishment? ... Who had control of
the books of the corporation, who in fact was the actual person operating this business? ... Were
they an employer?' " Id. (quoting the court's charge to the jury).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. 270 F. Supp. 165 (N.D. Cal. 1967), aff'd, 422 F.2d 26 (9th Cir.), cert. denied. 398 U S.
937 (1970).
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taxpayer was similar to that shown in Girard. In Pacific National, a surety
arranged for a bank loan for a construction agent, the proceeds of which were
under the surety's exclusive control.4 5 Specifically, the surety decided which
creditors of the taxpayer were to be paid, signed the taxpayer's checks and
paid the net wages of the taxpayer's employees. 46 Finding the surety to be a
"person" liable under section 6672 because it exercised absolute control over
the funds allocated by the loan, as well as other funds of the debtor, the
district court impliedly abandoned the Girard requirement that the surety
47
undertake all the day-to-day management functions of an employer in fact.
The court rejected Hill's interpretaton of section 6672 as a penal provision
and held instead that the section was a civil device intended to effectuate the
collection of unpaid taxes. 48 By affirming, the Ninth Circuit in effect expanded the judicial interpretation of "person" in section 6671(b) to make the
section 6672 penalty applicable to any "person" defined in section 7701(a)(1)
who "assumes the function of determining whether or not an employer will
pay over taxes withheld ....
Subsequent cases have followed Pacific National's formulation of a control
standard,5 0 requiring proof that the lender exercised substantial control over
the payment of funds to particular creditors. Control that has been found to
be of evidentiary significance includes the lender's power to put its employees
in charge of the taxpayer's fiscal or day-to-day operations, 5 1 to co-sign
44. See text accompanying notes 36-42 supra.
45. 270 F. Supp. at 169, 173.
46. Id. at 169-70.
47. Id. at 173.
48. Id.at 171. The court derived its interpretation of the intent of § 6672 from Bloom v.
United States, 272 F.2d 215, 223 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 803 (1960) (corporate
president who was controlling shareholder held liable for penalty under predecessor statute).
49. Pacific Nat'l Ins. Co. v. United States, 422 F.2d 26, 30 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
937 (1970); see text accompanying notes 22-27 supra. In affirming the view that § 6672 was
intended as a collection device, the court of appeals found the legislative history "uninformative."
422 F.2d at 31. However, it concluded that the congressional purpose was to hold those "actually
responsible" for the failure to pay over the tax liable and found no reason to exclude the creditor,
on the facts of the case, from the coverage of the section. Id.
50. In Dunham v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 700 (D. Conn. 1969), the lender-bank under
an accounts receivable financing agreement debited money from the financially embarrassed
debtor-taxpayer's account, without regard to the amount of collateral available. Taxpayer's
checks to the IRS in payment of withholding taxes, consequently, were returned for insufficient
funds. In attempting to cast § 6672 liability upon the lender, the debtor alleged that the lender
had assured that sufficient funds would be deposited in its account and that the lender previously
had paid certain other checks drawn by the taxpayer on an overdraft basis. In denying the
lender's motion for summary judgment, the court did not even mention the Hill-Girard
employer-in-fact standard. Similarly, in Werner v. United States, 374 F. Supp. 558 (D. Conn.
1974), the court held liable a lender who frequently advised its debtor on business matters,
ordered an audit and directed that the proceeds of its loan be paid to other creditors while it knew
that the debtor owed withholding taxes to the government. The court warned that § 6672 was
aimed at creditors who take effective control of a debtor's business, rather than at bona fide
creditors who urge an ailing corporation to pay off its debts.
51. Builders Fin. Co. v. United States, 352 F. Supp. 491, 494 (E.D. Mich. 1970), aff'd sub
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taxpayer's checks,5 2 to review creditor lists, 5 3 to approve or honor payments
to trade creditors,5 4 and to disapprove or dishonor tax payments to the

government."5
In Adams v. United States,5

in favor of the lender

57

6

the district court granted summary judgment

because it found the degree of control shown in the

affidavits to be similar to that in Hill, where the lender lacked power to

manage the taxpayer-corporation and the taxpayer was free to draw on its
own account without limit.5 8 On appeal, it was alleged that the lender
exercised final, day-to-day authority over the disbursement of taxpayer's
funds and that the lender at one point had "determined to discontinue"
payment of taxpayer's withholding taxes.- 9 If proven, these allegations would
justify finding the lender to be a "person" under the Pacific National

standard. 60 On the other hand, the lender contended that it had not participated in the management of taxpayer's business and that, except for one

instance, no advances made under the loan arrangement were subject to its
later control. 61 If these allegations were established, there could be no
liability, under Pacific National or under any other standard, for want of
62
sufficient lender control.

The lender also argued that the Hill decision was dispositive of the issue,

since the facts in Hill that indicated insufficient lender control were "dearly

in line" with the facts it alleged. 63 The court disposed of the lender's reliance
on Hill by asserting that the degree of lender control was "not as clearly
defined as it was in Hill," and that Hill's narrow approach to section 6672

liability had been eroded by the recent trend favoring an "expanding view" of
64
"persons" responsible.

nor. Mueller v. Nixon, 470 F.2d 1348 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 949 (1973); cf.
Werner v. United States, 374 F. Supp. 558, 562-63 (D. Conn. 1974).
52. Turner v. United States, 423 F.2d 448 (9th Cir. 1970); Silberberg v. United States, 355 F.
Supp. 1163, 1165 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Peterson v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 330 F. Supp. 424, 425
(D.D.C. 1971); Burack v. United States, 461 F.2d 1282, 1287 (CL Cl. 1972).
53. Turner v. United States, 423 F.2d 448 (9th Cir. 1970); cf. Peterson v. Fidelity & Deposit
Co., 330 F. Supp. 424 (D.D.C. 1971) (total authority to pay creditors).
54. Pacific Natl Ins. Co. v. United States, 270 F. Supp. 165, 170 (N.D. Cal. 1967), aff'd, 422
F.2d 26 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970); see Werner v. United States, 374 F. Supp.
558, 561-62 (D. Conn. 1974); Krueger v. United States, 326 F. Supp. 231, 232 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
55. Dunham v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 700, 702 (D. Conn. 1969). If a lender pays wages
directly to an employee of the debtor-taxpayer or credits funds to the latter's account for the
specific purpose of paying wages, liability is governed by Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 3505(a), (b).
56. 353 F. Supp. 333 (E.D. Wis. 1973), rev'd, 504 F.2d 73 (7th Cir. 1974).
57. Id. at 335.
58. Id. at 334-35.
59. 504 F.2d at 76. It was alleged that Lakeshore had at some point required Skobis to use
loan proceeds to pay such taxes. Id. at 74.
60. See text accompanying notes 43-55 supra.
61. 504 F.2d at 75.
62. See text accompanying notes 43-55 supra.
63. 504 F.2d at 76.
64. Id. at 76-77.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

Having distinguished Hill, the court attempted to set forth the appropriate
legal standard for lender liability. First, the court stated that liability for the
penalty was intended to attach to "that individual who has thefinal word as
to what bills should or should not be paid, and when."' 65 By way of
clarification, however, the court continued: "In this context, the word 'final'
means signifitant rather than exclusive control over the disbursal [sic] of
funds."'66 Finally, the court endeavored to restate the standard, saying that
"the ultimate liability for the failure to pay the tax lies" "where [the] 'ultimate
authority' to pay the tax is vested .... "67
The first statement of the legal standard is inexplicit insofar as the concept
of "significant control" is undefined. "Final word" is, at least, a reasonably
objective concept, even though it is clear that the court never considered the
employer-in-fact standard of the earlier cases applicable. 68 The court introduced further confusion into its restatement of the standard by failing to define
the term "ultimate authority" or to correlate its use with the concepts of "final
word" and "significant control."
If, as a matter of law, a lender is liable under section 6672 when, in the
course of a revolving loan agreement, he exercises actual control over loan
proceeds only in isolated instances, the conflicting affidavits did raise a
genuine issue as to a material fact. Since the allegations of the opposing
parties portrayed inconsistent versions as to the degree of power possessed by
the lender and the frequency of its assertion,6 9 the court, if it applied the
proper legal standard, correctly remanded the case for findings of fact.
The dissenting judge purported to disagree with the majority both as to the
legal standard to be applied and as to whether the affidavits raised any issue
of material fact. 70 His calculation of the legal test, however, was very similar
to that set forth by the court, and was equally indefinite. He stated that it was
the purpose of section 6672 "to 'impose liability upon those actually responsiLater, the
ble for an employer's failure to withhold and pay over the tax.' ,,71
dissent paraphrased the majority's first formulation of the standard, as
"whether [a] person has the final word or at least significant control
72
Apart from the difficulties inherent
.
" over the disbursement of funds.
65. Id. at 75 (emphasis added), citing Turner v. United States, 423 F.2d 448, 449 (9th Cir.
1970).
66. 504 F.2d at 75 (emphasis added), citing Dudley v. United States, 428 F.2d 1196, 1201

(9th Cir. 1970).
67. 504 F.2d at 77 (emphasis added).
68. "It is generally accepted ... that employment is not the test of liability under § 6672." Id.
at 76, citing Dunham v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 700, 702 (D. Conn. 1969), and Regan & Co.
v. United States, 290 F. Supp. 470, 481 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); see notes 23-24 supra and accompanying text.
69. See text accompanying notes 56-62 supra.
70. 504 F.2d at 77 (Campbell, J.,dissenting).
71. Id. at 78 (emphasis added), quoting Pacific Nat'l Ins. Co. v. United States, 422 F.2d 26,
31 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970).
72. 504 F.2d at 78 (emphasis added), citing Pacific Nat'l Ins. Co. v. United States, 422 F.2d
26, 31 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970).
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in a vague concept of mere "significant control," the meaning of the phrase
"actually responsible" is both unelucidated and uncoordinated with other
statements of the test throughout both opinions.
The dissent argued that under a revolving loan agreement in which the
collateral consists of accounts receivable, it is not unusual for the lender to
take and apply income and earnings of the debtor-taxpayer in order to
liquidate the past debt and make further advances. 7 3 On this basis he asserted
that the affidavits showed no control by the lender inconsistent with an
ordinary debtor-creditor relationship. 7 4 While he acknowledged that at least
one check had been made payable to a creditor of the tax-payer and that certain
other checks had been drawn jointly to the taxpayer and various taxing
authorities,7 5 he nevertheless asserted that no genuine issue of fact was raised.
Apparently, the dissent felt that, assuming the truth of the allegations, the
isolated act of issuing a check payable to a Skobis creditor, and the issuance
of a few other checks to various taxing authorities on behalf of Skobis, did
6672, since
not, as a matter of law, make Lakeshore a person under section
76
the other advances made by Lakeshore were unrestricted.
The [lender's] affidavit alleged that Lakeshore exercised no control over funds lent,
once they were advanced to Scobis. It was the respondeht's burden to establish a
genuine issue as to whether Lakeshore exercised "significant control" over the use of
these funds. The [debtor's] affidavit establishes only that Lakeshore controlled the
liquidated collateral, described by [debtor] as earnings and income.... [C]ontrol over
the liquidated collateral is irrelevant .... Significant control over the funds used to
pay the bills-i.e. the funds advanced by Lakeshore to Scobis-is the critical determinant under these circumstances.7
The discursive and imprecise language employed in the court's discussion of
the legal standard of control necessary to hold a person subject to section 6672
liability makes it unclear whether the Adams court intended to apply the legal
standard of Pacific National or rather intended to continue the "expanding
view" by including within the term "person" those who exercise less control
than prior cases required. Such imprecision, it is submitted, was unnecessary.
A broad interpretation of section 6672 has important implications for the
business community. It could, for example, cause lenders to become more
reluctant to advance funds in the absence of possessory collateral. Adams, by
looking at least in part to the degree to which the lender "arguably" could
control the debtor,78 rather than to the actual degree of control exercised,
injects more than a minimum degree of uncertainty as to what powers a
lender may exercise in connection with loans to potentially unstable
taxpayer-corporations." 9 The court left little in the way of guidelines for
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

504 F.2d at 79 (Campbell, J., dissenting).

Id.
Id. at 78.
Id. at 79-80.
Id. (emphasis added). The majority referred to the debtor as S"k"obis.
Id. at 76.
One commentator proposes extending lender liability under § 6672. His analysis, hotv-
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creditors who wish to avoid section 6672 liability. If the power to control is
the relevant factor, nearly all lending institutions risk section 6672 liability. If
the exercise of control in fact is the relevant factor, the court should have
made this clear. The practical result is that creditors who wish to avoid the
Adams situation should neither exercise nor assume any substantial control
over the use of any proceeds lent to the debtor, and should not, even as an
accommodation, participate in the ultimate disbursement of such proceeds.
Section 6672 does not, on its face, appear to require such a result. Yet, given
the imprecise legal standard set forth by the court, this appears to be the only
safe course to follow. Hopefully, courts will repudiate the " 'calculated
indefiniteness' "80 accepted in Adams in favor of a more precise legal standard
which stresses the degree to which the creditor has deprived the debtor of the
ability to pay over taxes that should have been withheld.
Samuel Feldman
ever, like the Adams court's, fails to account for any suppressive effect such an extension may
have on the financial community. Scott, One Hundred Percent Employment Tax Penalty: An
Analysis of IRC § 6672, 10 Washburn L.J. 1, 27-28 (1970). See generally Lindeman, Confusion
over Scope of 100% Penalty Makes it a Most "Settleable" Issue, 38 J. Tax. 50 (1973); Loo &
Krasne, Take the Money and Run: An Assessment of the 100 Per Cent Penalty, 51 Taxes 29
(1973).
80. 504 F.2d at 76, quoting Pacific Nat'l Ins. Co. v. United States, 422 F.2d 26, 30-31 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970).

